

# ESF #13: Public Safety and Security

## Appendix 1: Evacuation Appendix

Draft: 11/22/24

The Santa Cruz County (SCC) Operational Area (OA) Evacuation Planning Appendix (hereafter Evacuation Appendix) supplements information within the OA Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Base Plan, and *Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13: Public Safety and Security*<sup>1</sup>.

***The objective of the Evacuation Appendix is to save lives and reduce injuries by conducting a safe, equitable, efficient, and effective emergency evacuation of persons and animals.***

## P.1 Preface

### P.1.1 Statement of Intent

This Evacuation Appendix is advisory only. It is meant to assist in evacuation planning, but it is not meant to fulfill all legal requirements or duties. Nothing in this document alters or impedes the ability of federal, state, or local chief executives,

<sup>1</sup> *ESF 13: Public Safety and Security* is scheduled for development as the County works to further develop its Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), and its associated ESFs.

their government agencies, or their internal organizations from carrying out their specific authorities or performing their responsibilities under all applicable laws, executive orders, and directives. Further, this Appendix is not intended to alter the existing authorities of individual municipal or County agencies and does not convey new authorities upon any local, state, or federal official.

### **P.1.2 Evacuation Primary & Supporting Departments & ESFs**

As defined in the SCC OA EOP, the following agencies and departments have evacuation-related responsibilities.

Evacuation is covered within *Emergency Support Function (ESF) 13: Public Safety and Security*. Some supporting departments/groups are specific to Evacuation and not all of *ESF 13: Public Safety and Security*.

#### **P.1.2.1 Primary and Supporting Departments<sup>2</sup>**

##### **Primary Department:**

- SCC Sheriff's Office

##### **Supporting Departments and Groups:**

- SCC Community Development & Infrastructure (CDI), Public Works Division
- SCC Information Services Department (ISD), Geographic Information System (GIS)
- SCC Fire
- SCC Office of Response, Recovery, and Resilience (OR3)
- Animal Services Joint Power Authority (JPA)
- Equine Evacuation Group

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<sup>2</sup> **Primary departments** possess significant authorities, roles, resources, and responsibilities for coordinating and carrying out a particular ESF. Primary departments also serve as coordinators for ongoing planning and preparedness of the ESF. **Supporting Departments and Agencies** possess specific capabilities and resources that provide support to the primary department and mission of the ESF.

### P.1.2.2 Supporting ESFs

[Exhibit 1](#) below identifies the high-level responsibilities of supporting ESFs.

**Exhibit 1:** Evacuation Roles by ESF

ESF	Primary Evacuation Operations Roles
ESF #1: Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assess, identify, establish, and/or maintain transportation routes for evacuation and population surges to/from temporary evacuation points (TEPs), shelters, or other appropriate locations</li> <li>• Assess, identify, coordinate with paratransit to ensure accessible vehicle fleet is part of transportation/evacuation, to include service animal transport</li> <li>• Coordinate movement of special equipment</li> </ul>
ESF #2: Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain and coordinate accessible communication systems, inclusive of emergency communications systems.</li> </ul>
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Debris clearance from evacuation routes</li> <li>• Debris clearance from priority locations, including but not limited to fire and public safety stations, hospitals, dialysis centers, etc.</li> <li>• Infrastructure assessment and repair</li> </ul>
ESF #4: Firefighting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Firefighting operations affecting evacuation</li> <li>• Search and rescue in evacuation zones</li> </ul>
ESF #5: Emergency Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall coordination, resource management and EOC operations</li> <li>• Liaison with state and federal agencies, and nonprofit, community and business partners</li> </ul>

ESF	Primary Evacuation Operations Roles
ESF #6: Mass Care and Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination and establishment of TEPs, reception centers, shelters, etc.</li> <li>• Maintaining caches to support DAFN needs</li> <li>• Provision of services for evacuees, to include possible groups to support unique DAFN population needs</li> <li>• Ensure service animal provisions are included and planned for during an evacuation</li> </ul>
ESF #7: Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resource acquisition and deployment</li> <li>• Evacuation operation support, including logistical support for <i>ESF 6: Mass Care and Shelter</i> and evacuation locations.</li> </ul>
ESF #8: Public Health, Behavioral Health and Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evacuation of healthcare facilities, to include but not be limited to hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities, skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation centers, behavioral health facilities.</li> <li>• Medical and behavioral health support during evacuation</li> </ul>
ESF #11: Food & Agriculture & Livestock/Large Animals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination of animal evacuation</li> <li>• Agricultural impact assessment</li> </ul>
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traffic control</li> <li>• Security for evacuated areas</li> <li>• Enforcement of evacuation orders</li> </ul>
ESF #15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development and dissemination of evacuation information in accessible formats</li> <li>• Operation of accessible public warning systems</li> </ul>

## P.2 Plan Overview

A brief overview of the major areas contained within this planning appendix and its attachments is below.

Section #	Section Summary
Section 1	<b>Introduction.</b> Defines the purpose and scope of the Evacuation Planning Appendix. Outlines evacuation priorities, whole community considerations, key terminology, and planning assumptions.
Section 2	<b>Evacuation Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities.</b> Details the unique authorities for ordering evacuations, roles and responsibilities of Unified Command, the Disaster Duty Officer, the County Emergency Management Team, and the Readiness Working Group.
Section 3	<b>Evacuation Tools &amp; Technology.</b> Describes key tools used in evacuation planning and management, including Zonehaven, GIS, and Veoci.
Section 4	<b>Notifications.</b> Outlines the notification process for evacuations, including initial alerts, internal notifications, and external communications.
Section 5	<b>Re-Entry.</b> Describes the process of re-entry once it is safe for people to return to evacuated areas.
Section 6	<b>Supporting Plans.</b> Lists and describes various plans that support the Evacuation Planning Appendix.

Section #	Section Summary
<p><b>Attachments</b></p>	<p><b>Attachment 1: Evacuation Planning Areas (EPAs).</b> Describes the 16 unique EPAs within Santa Cruz County. Each EPA includes unique geographic features; considerations for people with disabilities and access and functional needs; fire and law enforcement agencies within the EPA; evacuation strategies; potential traffic control points; and potential sites within the EPA that can be added to the County’s list of temporary evacuation points.</p> <p>Each EPA is designed as a “tear out” and can be used as a stand-alone document in conjunction with the introductory EPA language.</p> <p><b>Attachment 2: Evacuation Route Planning Considerations.</b> Important planning considerations for planners when identifying evacuation routes.</p> <p><b>Attachment 3: Evacuation Resources.</b> A list of resources available from agencies, departments, nongovernmental partners, and businesses that can support evacuation.</p> <p><b>Attachment 4: Operational Readiness Activities.</b> A checklist of activities to take before, during, and after an evacuation.</p> <p><b>Attachment 5: Disaster Duty Officer Checklist.</b> A high-level list that can supplement the Disaster Duty Officer (DDO) checklist for evacuations.</p> <p><b>Attachment 6: Acronyms</b></p>

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## Section 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the *Evacuation Planning Appendix to Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13: Public Safety and Security* (Evacuation Appendix) provides a framework for preparedness, response, and recovery operations related to a planned or spontaneous evacuation due to a natural, human-caused, or industrial emergency. The framework outlined within the Appendix seeks to support:

- The coordination of multi-agency and whole community activities necessary for preparing and responding to a potential or actual evacuation event.
- Communication and coordination among County departments, Operational Area (OA) jurisdictions, and other local, state, and federal OA stakeholders, including private, nonprofit, and community partners and the general public.
- The goals, strategies, objectives, and inclusive approach outlined within the Santa Cruz County (SCC) OA Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Base Plan.

### 1.2 Evacuation & Re-Entry Priorities

Decisions regarding evacuation and re-entry will be based upon the priorities outlined in [Exhibit 2](#). The first priority (protect life) is the highest priority; other priorities are not listed in order of importance.

#### Exhibit 2: Evacuation & Re-Entry Response Priorities

Priorities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Protect Life, Reduce Injuries, and Mitigate Public Health Risks:</b> Separate or safeguard citizens from the hazard(s) and protect responders.</li><li>• <b>Reduce Risks:</b> Take necessary actions to protect property, the environment, critical infrastructure, and cultural resources.</li></ul>

### Priorities

- **Use Inclusive and Culturally Competent Approaches:** Address the needs of disproportionately affected populations, including people with disabilities and access and functional needs (DAFN), in accordance with the OA's Whole Community Considerations. **(See Section 1.3 [hyperlink.](#))**
- **Public Communication:** Provide timely, accurate information in accessible formats and various languages to all affected populations.
- **Minimize Displacement:** Limit the time evacuees are separated from home, and reduce the distance they must travel to access safe shelter.
- **Unified Command:** Establish an inclusive Unified Command early that involves all relevant partners, such as fire, law enforcement, emergency management, health, human services, state parks, and so forth to ensure a coordinated proactive response to safety, operational, and community needs.

## 1.3 Whole Community Considerations

The County's Whole Community Approach is described in more detail in the **EOP Base Plan Section 3.3: Whole Community Strategy and Inclusion** and is incorporated into the OA Emergency Operations Center (EOC), as well as the overall emergency management structure outlined within **ESF 5: Emergency Management**.

**EOP Base Plan Section 2.3: Situation/Community Overview** provides additional details to enhance understanding of the nuances and levels of need within the SCC OA that must be factored into evacuation and emergency response.

*Evacuation planners and partners are strongly encouraged to review the above-referenced EOP Base Plan sections, at a minimum, to improve understanding of SCC whole community needs.*

The County uses a “Whole Community”<sup>3</sup> approach to engage the full capacity of the private and nonprofit sectors, including businesses, faith-based and community-based organizations, and the public, in conjunction with local, tribal, state, and federal governmental partners. This helps to improve the overall representation and inclusion of people/communities who are disproportionately impacted by disasters but are often marginalized. The EOP Base Plan recognizes that:

*Very often the impacts of hazards fall disproportionately on the most disadvantaged or marginalized and structurally excluded people in a community. The multi-layered concept of social vulnerability helps explain why people often experience a hazard differently, even when they experience the same amount of physical impact.*

Specific community considerations are included in **Section A.1: County-wide Disability, Access and Functional Needs (DAFN) Considerations** [hyperlink](#) and within each identified Evacuation Planning Area (EPA).

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<sup>3</sup> Santa Cruz County's “Whole Community” includes, but is not limited to stakeholders from County departments, incorporated cities, unincorporated areas, neighborhoods, towns, and other areas; joint powers authorities (JPAs), state, and federal agencies; public, private, and nonprofit sectors, including faith-based organizations and community-based organizations (FBO/CBOs); academic and research-based establishments; residents and visitors; and others that may play roles in the community.

“FEMA's “Whole Community” approach is an acknowledged process by which a wide range of stakeholders come together to better understand and assess the needs of their respective communities, then determine the best ways to organize and strengthen resources, capacities, and interests.

**1.4 Evacuation Terminology & Key Definitions**

**Exhibit 3** provides a list of key terms used throughout this Evacuation Appendix. All planners and personnel should familiarize themselves with these terms and definitions to ensure consistent interpretation and application.

**Exhibit 3:** Key Evacuation Plan Terms & Definitions

Term	Definition
<i>Baseline Terms</i>	
<i>County &amp; City References</i>	<p><i>“County”, “county”, “City” and “city” are used intentionally. Nuances do exist. Readers should interpret the terms as they fit best within the context of the sentence. In general:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>• County or City (uppercase 'C'): Refers to the official government entity of Santa Cruz County or the incorporated City of reference, including their formal administrative and operational structures.</i></li> <li><i>• county or city (lowercase 'c'): Indicates the geographic area and community within the county or city boundaries, rather than the governmental body.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>Geographical references may also be written as “Santa Cruz County”, such as in “the greater Santa Cruz County community”.</i></p>
<i>Disabilities, Access and Functional Needs (DAFN)</i>	<p><i>The DAFN population consists of individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities; physical disabilities; chronic, episodic, temporary conditions and/or disabilities; injuries; limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking; those who are pregnant; older adults; children; people living in institutionalized settings; those who are low income; homeless; digitally disadvantaged; transportation</i></p>

Term	Definition
	<p><i>disadvantaged; as well as but not limited to those who are dependent on public transit.<sup>4</sup></i></p> <p><i>Additional DAFN-specific information is listed for each EPA in <b>Attachment 1: Evacuation Planning Areas [hyperlink]</b>. Significant information exists throughout the SCC OA EOP Base Plan that all planners should comprehensively understand.</i></p>
<p><i>Critical Facilities</i></p>	<p><i>Critical facilities include, but are not limited to, key infrastructure and sites essential for public safety and emergency response, including hospitals, fire and police stations, schools, transit hubs, and utilities. Facilities are not specified by name in this Appendix due to security considerations, and the quantity of named sites.</i></p> <p><i>Sites are noted within Zonehaven, within GIS layers, and/or are available through the EOC. Cities and private sector partners may also have similar information.</i></p>
<p><i>Evacuation-Specific Terminology</i></p>	
<p><i>Evacuation</i></p>	<p><i>The withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of people from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their relocation to safe areas.</i></p>
<p><i>Evacuation Zone</i></p>	<p><i>Evacuation zones are pre-identified portions of the county that are used to communicate and manage evacuations. The county has over 200 evacuation zones. See <b>Section 3.1: Zonehaven Hyperlink</b> for more information.</i></p>

<sup>4</sup> From CA Code Section 8593.3: *Integration of Access and Functional Needs into Emergency Plan*. In plain language, a disability can include people who have difficulty learning, understanding, remembering, reading, speaking, moving, or walking.

Term	Definition
<i>Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)</i>	<i>Evacuation Planning Areas are geographic divisions of the county designed to support evacuation planning, decision-making, and public understanding. They are an organizational tool that groups multiple Zonehaven zones into larger, more recognizable areas.</i>
<i>Evacuation Warning</i>	<i>Notification of a potential threat to life or property. Individuals requiring extra time to evacuate, such as those with disabilities and access or functional needs, pets, or livestock, should begin evacuating immediately.</i>
<i>Evacuation Order</i>	<i>A mandatory directive to leave immediately due to an immediate threat to life. The area is legally and lawfully closed to public access.</i>
<i>Evacuation Order(s) Lifted</i>	<i>A formal announcement that evacuees may return to an area previously under evacuation. While the evacuation order is rescinded, some hazards or restrictions may remain in place.</i>
<i>“All Clear”</i>	<i>A declaration that all hazards or threats have been fully mitigated, and an evacuated area is safe for return with no remaining restrictions or risks.</i>
<i>Weather-Related Terminology</i>	
<i>Advisory</i>	<i>Issued when hazardous weather or a hydrologic event is expected to cause inconvenience or minor disruptions, but not pose an immediate threat to life or property. Individuals with DAFN should take early precautions. Caution is advised, as conditions could worsen.</i>
<i>Watch</i>	<i>Issued when the risk of hazardous weather or a hydrologic event has increased, but its occurrence, location, or timing is uncertain. A watch provides lead time for preparedness, especially for those with DAFN. It signals that hazardous weather</i>

Term	Definition
	<i>is possible, and people should have a plan of action and stay informed.</i>
Warning	<i>Issued when hazardous weather or a hydrologic event is occurring, imminent, or highly likely, posing an immediate threat to life or property. Protective action should be taken immediately.</i>
<b>Transportation-Related Terms</b>	
Ingress	<i>The entry points and routes used to access an area.</i>
Egress	<i>The exit points and routes used to leave an area.</i>
Major Road	<i>A primary transportation route designed to carry high volumes of traffic between key destinations. It typically connects cities or major areas within a city or municipality, often featuring multiple lanes and controlled access points, such as stop signs or traffic lights.</i>
Minor Road	<i>A smaller transportation route that carries lower volumes of traffic compared to major roads. These roads typically connect local areas, residential neighborhoods, or provide access to individual properties.</i>
Bottleneck Areas	<i>Locations along evacuation routes where traffic or movement may become congested, potentially delaying or obstructing evacuation efforts. These areas have been initially identified by the County within each EPA, but are subject to further review and input. Grant funding may be sought to address and mitigate these issues as part of ongoing efforts to improve evacuation planning and infrastructure.</i>
Safe Refuge Areas	<i>A conceptual approach that may be used to pursue grant funding for hazard mitigation. These areas, located along</i>

Term	Definition
	<p><i>potential evacuation routes, could benefit from fire and other hazard mitigation measures to allow for safe passage or refuge when evacuation routes become gridlocked or impassable (see also 'Bottleneck Areas' above). A notable example is the 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, California, where several people perished in their cars while attempting to evacuate.</i></p>
<p><i>Evacuation Points or Areas</i></p>	
<p><i>Shelter</i></p>	<p><i>Temporary facilities that provide safety, food, water, and basic medical care for individuals, families, and animals displaced by disasters. These shelters support evacuees until they can return home or transition to longer-term housing options.</i></p>
<p><i>Temporary Evacuation Point (TEP)</i></p>	<p><i>A designated nearby location out of the threat/evacuation area where evacuees can gather temporarily after an evacuation. TEPs are used for short-term refuge, often with minimal or no services, until it is safe to relocate to a long-term shelter or safer destination. These areas, which may also be referred to as Temporary Assembly Areas, can include large parking lots, parks, or other open spaces. They may also serve as a safe stopping point during dynamic or ongoing emergency situations.</i></p>

### 1.5 Planning Assumptions

- Emergency management activities related to evacuation will be conducted using the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS).
- All County employees are designated as Disaster Service Workers (DSWs) and may be called upon to assist with evacuation operations.
- Evacuation operations may need to be adjusted for sudden, no-notice evacuations or planned, phased evacuations, depending on the nature of the incident.



- Changing conditions may require evacuation plans to be modified quickly during an incident.
- An evacuation operation is influenced by the number of evacuees and the area's characteristics. For example, densely populated areas or large venues present greater challenges than sparsely populated zones.
- Access to and use of evacuation assets, including accessible transportation, ambulances, ambulettes/specially equipped vehicles, and so forth, will be challenging, depending upon the size of the event.
- Mutual aid assistance may be required when local evacuation resources are exhausted.
- Agreements and contracts must be in place within the jurisdiction, as well as with partnering jurisdictions, organizations, and suppliers (e.g., durable medical equipment suppliers).
- Large-scale evacuations may overwhelm normal transportation routes and systems.
- The capacity of the street network to handle evacuation traffic is variable and can be influenced by various factors, such as intersection frequency and traffic signal timing. Capacity can be optimized through strategic traffic management techniques and infrastructure adjustments.
- The county's geography, road access limitations, and potential for isolation in certain areas may result in delays or challenges in conducting evacuations and providing evacuation assistance, especially when it comes to assisting people who have disabilities and access and functional needs (DAFN).
- Public preparedness and readiness campaigns conducted on a routine basis during 'blue sky' (e.g., non-disaster times) are essential for ensuring an orderly and efficient evacuation.
- The OA has populations with varied DAFN, including culturally diverse populations, who will require specialized evacuation assistance and messaging.
- Some residents may be unable to independently evacuate or may be reluctant or refuse to evacuate due to any number of perceived or actual

financial, health, physical, communication/language, and/or safety issues/barriers.

- The OA will need to plan for transportation and assistance for individuals who do not have the means to independently evacuate, including children, persons with disabilities and access and functional needs, unhoused individuals, and persons in healthcare centers, long-term care settings, and detention centers or jails, among others.
- A significant portion of the population will be evacuating with durable medical equipment, other medical supplies, caregivers, family members, and companion or service animals. Considerations will need to be made in planning to accommodate these needs.
- Effective evacuation planning relies on robust community engagement, including partnerships with DAFN Advisory Committees, disability organizations and service providers, and community stakeholders. The OA involves these partners in emergency planning, preparedness, response, and recovery.
- The OA will use the DAFN Advisory Committee to broaden, enhance, and validate communication, evacuation, and transportation strategies.
- Education and outreach done in collaboration with community partners is critical to address common barriers and present options and solutions for overcoming these challenges.
- Evacuation of certain facilities, such as hospitals, nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), schools, detention centers, and jails, will require significant specialized resources and coordination. Medical-related evacuations will be coordinated in conjunction with *ESF 8: Public Health, Behavioral Health and Medical*. Some of these facilities (such as hospitals) have mandated evacuation plans, and the OA will need to coordinate and support the local area and these facilities with planning, response and recovery.
- Telecommunication and information technology services may be interrupted or inoperable during an evacuation, amplifying already challenging communications in the county and requiring alternative communication methods. Messages must be made accessible for those with DAFN and Limited English Proficiency (LEP).

- Since public information and alert and warning systems may not reach all impacted populations, additional outreach methods (including more community-based and non-traditional approaches) are needed. Public Information and Warning will be addressed thoroughly within *ESF #15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*.
- Advance notice enhances the effectiveness of public information dissemination and resource mobilization, and it can improve overall evacuation preparedness efforts. Advanced notice allows for more comprehensive planning and execution.
- Shelter operations will need to be coordinated concurrently with evacuation activities.
- While evacuees are encouraged to seek shelter with a trusted individual (e.g., friends, family, or other safe person) for 24 or more hours, it is essential to provide clear and culturally sensitive messaging about sheltering options. This messaging should address the needs of diverse communities, including those with varying cultural or personal identities, and accessibility needs. Information should include accessibility measures, the level of care available, and alternative options for those who require a higher level of care than can be provided at a temporary evacuation point or shelter.

## Section 2: Evacuation Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities

### 2.1 Evacuation Authorities

Within unincorporated areas of the County, the Sheriff's Office has the primary authority to order an evacuation. Within incorporated cities, the authority to order evacuations rests with the local law enforcement agency.

In most cases, however, evacuation, evacuation authority, and the issuance of evacuation orders are not limited to the authority of one agency. [Exhibit 4: Evacuation Authority within SCC](#) provides a list of agencies within the OA that coordinate immediate evacuation efforts.

Officials must work together with support from law enforcement, fire agencies, animal services/equine evacuation, human services, public health, and other agencies, to ensure that evacuation decisions are made and implemented equitably and effectively.

**Exhibit 4:** Evacuation Authority within SCC

<b>Agency with Authority</b>	<b>Jurisdiction of Authority</b>	<b>Complexities</b>
<i>Santa Cruz County Sheriff</i>	<i>County-wide</i>	<i>Sheriff covers all unincorporated areas in the county. The Sheriff is also the Operational Area (OA) law enforcement mutual aid coordinator.</i>
<i>Capitola Police Department (CPD)</i>	<i>City of Capitola</i>	
<i>Santa Cruz Police Department (SCPD)</i>	<i>City of Santa Cruz</i>	
<i>Scotts Valley Police Department (SVPD)</i>	<i>City of Scotts Valley</i>	
<i>Watsonville Police Department (PD)</i>	<i>City of Watsonville</i>	
<i>CA State Parks</i>	<i>State Park Properties</i>	<i>Located throughout the entire County with parks in incorporated and</i>

Agency with Authority	Jurisdiction of Authority	Complexities
		<i>unincorporated areas of the county, as well as neighboring counties.</i>
Harbormaster and Santa Cruz Harbor Patrol City of Santa Cruz PD Sheriff	Santa Cruz Port District inclusive of land and waterside jurisdictional areas of authority	The U.S. Coast Guard has jurisdiction under Federal law granted to the Captain of the Port (COTP).  The Board of Port Commissioners (BPC) may also have some authority depending upon the nature and amount of notice of the event.
Animal Services JPA	County-wide	Evacuation authority to evacuate small and large animals. Has authority to enter closed areas in accordance with Unified Command or other authorities at the time of the evacuation to support animal evacuation.
University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) Chancellor and UCSC Police Department	Campus-wide	For immediate threats, the UCSC Police Department has evacuation authority. For larger evacuations, or for noticed emergencies, authority rests with the Chancellor. Depending upon the type of event and the amount of notice, authorities and decisions may also involve the University of California Board of Regents and the California Governor's Office (as the head of the UC system).
Cabrillo College - Santa Cruz County	Campus-wide	A Sheriff substation is located on the Aptos campus. Watsonville PD has a

Agency with Authority	Jurisdiction of Authority	Complexities
<i>Sheriff acts as the law enforcement authority</i>		<i>station across the street from the main campus in Watsonville.</i>
<i>Special/large, planned events</i>	<i>Varies</i>	<i>Evacuation authorities are in accordance with permit processes and special event plans.</i>
<i>Medical and Healthcare Evacuation</i>	<i>See ESF 8: Public Health, Behavioral Health and Medical</i>	<i>Hospitals and other residential healthcare facilities are required by federal and state regulations to have their own emergency evacuation plans. These plans are operated in conjunction with state and federal health authorities and jurisdictions. Depending upon the threat, topography, and hospital status, a hospital may shelter in place even if the surrounding area is under an evacuation order. Decisions are made in conjunction with the appropriate authorities. Information specific to healthcare facility evacuation will be outlined in ESF #8: Public Health, Behavioral Health and Medical.</i>
<i>School Districts</i>	<i>District Superintendents</i>	<i>School evacuations are coordinated with local authorities (fire, law, public health).  Note: Parents must be sent emergency alerts pertaining to events that affect, or may affect, their child(ren)'s school(s). If parents are asked to pick their child(ren) up from school and do not do so, the school or school district must arrange for</i>

Agency with Authority	Jurisdiction of Authority	Complexities
		<i>supervision of these children and facilitate reunification with their families. OR3, or the SCC OA EOC when activated, will assist as necessary.</i>
California Highway Patrol ([CHP], State highways)	Commander, Santa Cruz District Office	CHP has authority for state highways. Evacuation routes using state highways must be coordinated with CHP and local authorities (fire, law).

## 2.2 Unified Command

Unified Command (UC) is established during an active incident to coordinate field response among key authorities and supporting agencies. The initial UC may include fire, law enforcement, and other first response agencies (such as Public Works, California State Parks, and California Highway Patrol (CHP))—depending upon the situation and the specific areas involved. Additional agencies, such as the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), SCC Health Services Agency (HSA), SCC Human Services Department (HSD), OR3, Animal Services, and others, may be integrated into the UC for evacuation support.

In the event of hazardous materials, chemical, or biological incidents, other agencies may be integrated into the UC by statute, regulation, or to provide threat-specific expertise and resources.

During public health emergencies, the SCC Public Health Officer may establish exclusion zones or identify specific areas that are unsafe or need to be made clear. These scenarios may cause the need for evacuation where the UC will be supporting the Health Officer in executing the Public Health Order.

The UC may assess the situation, determine evacuation orders and enforcement plans, or provide support for evacuation efforts based on the incident.

The UC within SCC commonly uses the Zonehaven digital tool for evacuation support and management whenever possible (see **Section 3: Evacuation Tools**

**and Technology** [\[hyperlink\]](#). Additional low-tech evacuation maps and other resources are also available per agency-specific procedures.

## 2.3 Disaster Duty Officer

The Disaster Duty Officer (DDO) is a 24/7 position staffed by OR3 or their delegated authority. The DDO is one of the first to be notified by the UC or other authorities. The DDO plays an essential role in extending notifications, as well as supporting alert and warning efforts. The DDO may also initially activate the SCC OA Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and/or appropriate ESFs, if necessary or advisable.

Refer to **Section P.1.2: Evacuation Primary & Supporting Departments & ESFs** [\[hyperlink\]](#) for ESF information, and **Section 2.4: OA Emergency Operations Center** [\[hyperlink\]](#)

EOC and ESF activation follow procedures outlined within *ESF 5: Emergency Management* and the *EOC Manual*.

## 2.4 OA Emergency Operations Center

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will coordinate with, and support field operations as described in *ESF 5: Emergency Management*. The EOC may be activated partially (Levels II or III) or fully activated (Level I).

### 2.4.1 EOC Activation & Evacuation Related Scenarios

**Exhibit 5** offers potential evacuation scenarios that may correspond to an anticipated EOC activation level. Scenarios and events may range in size, scale, and forecast or actual complexity. Therefore, the County Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), the Director of Emergency Management (DEM), the Sheriff, the Public Health Officer, or their successors if they are unavailable will make the ultimate decision as to the initial EOC activation level. The DDO may also initiate EOC activation in accordance with protocols and procedures outlined in the EOC Manual.

**Exhibit 5:** EOC Activation Levels & Evacuation Examples



LEVEL	OPERATIONAL STATUS	DESCRIPTION	EVACUATION EXAMPLES INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:
<b>Level 4</b>	Standby/Ready Mode: 24/7 monitoring by the DDO	<p>Baseline position. The County operates under this Level on a daily basis.</p> <p>The DDO is on standby to escalate activation and action 24/7.</p>	<p>Small, localized evacuation</p> <p>Severe weather watch</p> <p>Red Flag (fire) conditions</p>
<b>Level 3</b>	Partial Activation: Monitoring & Documentation Only	<p>Minor planned or unplanned event has occurred, or will occur, and resources are adequate to address.</p> <p>EOC role is to monitor, document, and coordinate with field operations for initial evacuation planning.</p>	<p>Evacuation of a neighborhood or small community</p> <p>Isolated wildfire threatening the populated area</p> <p>Atmospheric river warning</p> <p>Tsunami or Storm Watch/ Warning</p>

LEVEL	OPERATIONAL STATUS	DESCRIPTION	EVACUATION EXAMPLES INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:
<b>Level 2</b>	Partial Activation	<p>Activate EOC Management Team and additional entities/ESFs identified as necessary to the management of the specific event.</p> <p>These positions may be filled at the physical location of the EOC or remotely, virtually, via conference call, etc.</p>	<p>Large wildfire, flood or expanding threat</p> <p>Activation of Multiple Zonehaven Zones</p> <p>Any of the National Planning Scenarios</p> <p>Any event which results in, or may result in, large-scale displacement of people</p>
<b>Level 1</b>	Full Activation	Full activation of the EOC. All positions are activated.	Large-scale county or regional evacuation

### 2.4.2 Essential Elements of Information

To rapidly assist the EOC and other partners in establishing and maintaining situational awareness (or a Common Operating Picture (COP)), as well as to ultimately make more informed decisions and more effectively conduct public information distribution, a master list of Essential Elements of Information (EIs) was developed as part of the EOC planning process. This EI Master List was expanded to include additional evacuation-related EIs. The list is maintained by OR3 and updated at least annually in accordance with the Readiness Working Group (RWG) and County Emergency Management Team (CEMT).

The EEI Master List will also be made available within the County OA's EOC and emergency management tool Veoci, as well as other tools. Each EEI includes:

- The type(s) of information to be gathered
- Expected, likely, and/or potential sources for information and data
- Expected contributions from such information
- Expected timeframe for gathering and reporting information
- EOC sections and/or responsible agencies/positions for gathering and/or managing said information

***A list of preliminary Essential Elements of Information (EEIs), to include their potential sources and expected contributions, can be found in Attachment B.***

### **2.4.3 EOC Responsibilities**

During an evacuation, critical ongoing tasks to be carried out in the OA EOC include:

- Coordinate the setup and staffing of evacuation facilities, including Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) and shelters.
- Ensure there are sufficient resources for evacuation operations, inclusive of shelter operations.
- Track progress of evacuation(s).
- Coordinate with the UC for re-entry of residents and business owners into evacuation areas when safe to do so following an "all clear" notification.
- Coordinate with traditional and social media to perform rumor control and to provide accurate and effective information regarding the evacuation in conjunction with the Joint Information Center (JIC), if activated.
- Ensure public information is accessible, up-to-date, and compliant with Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
- Coordinate with government and non-governmental agencies to identify and address DAFN-related challenges effectively. The EOC has specific

positions with authority dedicated to ensuring DAFN needs are identified and met. The DAFN Coordinator and Cultural Competency Coordinator (CCC) coordinate with all EOC sections to identify unmet needs and provide support, guidance, and information as it relates to DAFN. The CCC provides information to support the EOC's COP on socio-cultural implications of unfolding events and response activities.

- In accordance with the roles and authorities outlined in *ESF 8: Public Health, Behavioral Health and Medical*, provide support for healthcare facility evacuations, such as hospitals, nursing homes, etc.

## **2.5 Other Groups with Key Supporting Roles**

### **2.5.1 County Emergency Management Team**

The County Emergency Management Team is comprised of department heads or positions with intimate knowledge of their department or program/business unit function(s), policies, and procedures related to emergency support within the County. The CEMT plays an important role in supporting evacuation efforts. Members of the CEMT help staff key EOC positions to coordinate evacuation, provide operational leadership, and foster inter-departmental coordination.

### **2.5.2 Readiness Working Group**

The Readiness Working Group (RWG) is comprised of government agencies (staff at all levels), private sector/businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and community-based organizations (CBOs). The intent is to ensure “whole community” (diverse) representation in preparedness and response – ultimately building the capability and capacity of the OA.

Resources of RWG members can be leveraged in a disaster or emergency to enhance two-way, whole community situational awareness, information, and communication. The County EOC, at all activation levels, can leverage the RWG to receive information to better inform executive level discussion and decision making.

Leveraging the resources and human networks within the RWG can improve external communication and relations, which remain core challenges due to the unique geography and jurisdictional authorities within Santa Cruz.

The RWG can provide input on evacuation planning, especially pertaining to marginalized or structurally excluded groups.

## Section 3: Evacuation Tools & Technology

### 3.1 Zonehaven

All jurisdictions within the Santa Cruz County (SCC) Operational Area (OA) use a zonal evacuation system called Zonehaven (e.g., Genasys Protect<sup>5</sup>) to support evacuation planning and manage evacuations. The SCC OA is divided into over 200 distinct zones, each with a unique identifier (e.g., SCZ-E030, BOU-E028, WTS-E014-B). The county is currently modifying zones for flooding and other hazards.

The system allows for targeted evacuation orders based on specific threats and the county's varied topography. For example, a mountainous region may not need to be evacuated for a flood at a lower elevation.

Zonehaven also has fields to keep track of needs related to critical facilities and specific populations. This includes some limited disabilities and access and functional needs (DAFN) considerations, temporary evacuation point (TEP) locations, and other fields noted within this Evacuation Appendix that may be helpful for responders when considering evacuations.

Subject to further development and information inputs, the system has the potential to offer real-time, zone-specific information about evacuation status, safe routes, critical facilities, nearby temporary evacuation points, shelters, etc.

Additionally, Zonehaven zones are captured on a GIS layer which can be integrated with other hazard specific GIS layers, such as a tsunami, flood, liquefaction, etc.

Evacuation Planning Areas (EPAs), which are comprised of several zones, indicate potential primary and alternate evacuation routes to the greatest extent possible (**see Attachment 1: Evacuation Planning Areas [\[hyperlink\]](#)**).

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<sup>5</sup> Zonehaven was acquired by Genasys Inc. in 2021, and has since been rebranded as Genasys EVAC/Genasys Protect. Due to familiarity and well-known documentation as Zonehaven, the County and its partners, as well as numerous other jurisdictions, still commonly refer to the system as Zonehaven.

Zonehaven is fully integrated with CruzAware, the County's mass notification system which allows for real-time rapid evacuation alerting.

### 3.1.1 Zonehaven Activation & Access

The activating authority will determine which Zonehaven zones are to be evacuated and the regional evacuation routes to be used for evacuating traffic from the affected area, including the direction of flow. In some cases, zones may be split and only partially evacuated.

Procedures for using Zonehaven are detailed in the **Santa Cruz OR3 Zonehaven Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)**. The SOP is available **[insert location]**.

Field first responders and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) for all jurisdictions within the county have access to Zonehaven via the internet, digital download, and/or hard copy as part of a unified Common Operating Picture (COP).

### 3.1.2 Zonebooks

The Sheriff's Office maintains hard copy binders at its headquarters with physical addresses within each Zonehaven zone for use during evacuation. Each Zonehaven zone has an individual binder. A checklist is included in each binder to indicate if notification or contact was made. "Zonebooks" are assigned and distributed to personnel (law enforcement, arriving mutual aid resources, trained Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) members, and others) who may perform door-to-door notifications during evacuation warnings and orders.

## 3.2 Veoci

Veoci is the OA EOC's incident management software platform. (It replaced WebEOC.) The tool includes turn-key and customizable templates for planning, communication, and after-action reports. Veoci is also fully integrated with ArcGIS mapping. The system is scheduled for full implementation by December 2024.

## 3.3 Available GIS Layers

The County Information Services Department (ISD) Geographic Information Systems (GIS) group has created and/or can provide access to the GIS data

layers listed below. Other layers may be possible during an emergency as required to support successful operations, and as staff and technology are available:

- Census layers
- Road networks
- Single ingress/egress areas
- Fire Protection Agency boundaries
- Law Enforcement Jurisdiction/Beat Maps
- Hazard maps (fire, flood, tsunami, landslide, liquefaction, earthquake fault lines)
- Population density
- Bottleneck areas
- Critical facilities, including but not limited to:
  - Ambulance/First responder vehicle staging locations
  - Assisted living facilities
  - Camps/Recreational Areas
  - Childcare Centers
  - Commodity Points of Distribution (CPOD) locations
  - Communication towers
  - Convalescence sites
  - Correctional facilities
  - Dialysis Centers
  - EHS Hazardous Waste Sites (large quantities)
  - Fire and Police Stations
  - Hospitals
  - Mobile home parks
  - PG&E-provided DAFN registry information (specialized access requirements exist in accordance with legal and contractual agreements)
  - Potential Temporary Evacuation Point (TEP) sites
  - Public transportation routes
  - Residential mental health centers
  - Schools and School Districts (Elementary, Middle, High)



- Shelter sites
- Shopping malls
- Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs)
- Transit facilities
- Water pumping stations
- Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program sites

The SCC Human Services Department (HSD) has also created, and/or has access to the layers and data listed below. Given the private information (names, addresses, benefits, etc.) stored within these layers, access is limited. In an emergency however, HSD can use the layers within their respective permissions to conduct outreach and help provide services:

- PG&E DAFN Registry
- Adult Protective Services (APS)
- In-Home Supportive Services (IHHS)
- Employment & Benefits Services: CalSAWS (benefits data), Medi-Cal, CalFresh, CalWORKs, and General Assistance
- Housing for Health Housing Management Information System (HMIS)

### **3.3.1 SAFER Application**

The ISD GIS team has built a robust web-based GIS application called Situational Awareness for Emergency Response (SAFER) to help with COP visualization(s). SAFER also syncs with official social media feeds throughout the County and includes links and maps to other official information sources. Additional functionality and integration will continue to be developed.

The application is available at [Situational Awareness For Emergency Response](#).

## **3.4 Technology Tool Information Maintenance and Updates**

OR3, in coordination with ISD GIS, HSD, and other relevant County departments, will review, update, and validate data and information within GIS layers that support evacuation decisions as part of the annual plan review process, at a minimum.

Additional GIS layers and data can be added as identified in consultation with ISD GIS to better support evacuation planning and response. Annual updates should include updates to information and resources within Zonehaven, Veoci, DAFN registries, and other tools to be sure they stay relevant.

Zonebooks should be updated and physically printed annually by the Sheriff's Office if substantial changes have been made.

## Section 4: Notification, Alert, and Communication

### 4.1 Notification and Alert Overview

When a significant incident occurs that may or will trigger an evacuation, first response agencies (fire, law enforcement, public health, etc.) may be the first to initiate notification, especially for no-notice events.

The notification process for evacuation encompasses both initial alerts to responding agencies, internal communications to supporting agencies, and external notifications to the public.

*The unique topography, communications, and power infrastructure challenges Santa Cruz County (SCC) faces in many areas require outreach as rapidly as possible through as many networks and voices as possible.*

*There is no scenario where it is envisioned that digital alerts will reach all relevant individuals or populations in time to safely evacuate. Further, widespread DAFN and cultural differences in communication and access to systems require alternate notification and messaging strategies. The power of the county's robust trusted, neighbor-to-neighbor, and peer networks, as well as the need for immediate broad notifications within the SCC Operational Area (OA), cannot be overstated.*

### 4.2 Internal and Response Agency/ESF Notifications

If an evacuation is deemed possible or necessary, the initial responding agency and/or the established Unified Command (UC) will:

- Notify the County's Disaster Duty Officer (DDO) or the OA Emergency Operations Center (EOC) if activated, and each agency's respective Chain of Command regarding the potential or necessary evacuation decision.
- Inform key officials, which may include Fire Chief(s), the Sheriff's Office, Police Chief(s), the Emergency Management Director, and the County Administrative Officer.

- Activate CruzAware (the OA's mass notification system), to send automated emergency notifications to landlines and registered mobile phones in the affected areas.

Upon receiving notification, the DDO plays an important role in the internal notification process:

- The DDO notifies the County Emergency Management Team (CEMT) and the Readiness Working Group (RWG) via the priority contact list (referred to as the "Bat Phone List").
- In conjunction with the activating agency/UC, confirm Public Information Officers (PIOs) from the county and other public safety organizations are promptly informed and can begin communicating accurate information regarding evacuation orders, warnings, and shelter-in-place directives in accessible formats, such as those required by Section 508 and other accessibility standards and requirements.

Members of the CEMT and RWG will then act as force multipliers for notifications and evacuation support to other County agencies/departments, as well as other agencies and supporting community organizations, businesses, and partner agencies along with official Public Information Officers (PIOs).

***All jurisdictions are at risk of mis-, mal-, and disinformation. Official information must be validated, but it must also work at the speed of need to maintain public trust and to minimize the risks. Often, particularly in no-notice evacuation scenarios, response agencies are slow to provide information, which opens the door to mis- and deliberate mal- and disinformation.***

### 4.3 External Notifications

Effective and timely communication is critical during evacuations to ensure public safety and to maintain public trust. Santa Cruz County will utilize a diverse range of notification methods to reach all segments of the population, including those with disabilities and access and functional needs (DAFN), which includes people with limited/no English proficiency (LEP/NEP). The County's approach to external

notifications during evacuations will emphasize inclusivity and cultural competence.

Notification methods span from no-tech to high-tech solutions, recognizing the varied communication needs and access capabilities across the geographically diverse county. Communication methods include leveraging the robust network of faith-based and other community-based organizations.

[Exhibit 6: Notification Methods](#) outlines no-tech, low-tech, and high-tech notification methods available to alert and inform the public during evacuation scenarios.

**ESF 15: Public Information and Warning/External Affairs will detail the different public information warning methods inclusive of low-tech/no-tech options and provide templates for evacuation messaging. This Annex is currently under development and slated for completion [need date of completion].**

**Exhibit 6:** Notification Methods

Notification Method	Type	Description	Power Requirements
Door-to-Door Notifications	No-tech	Emergency personnel and trained Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) members physically visit homes and businesses	No power
Vehicle-mounted Public Address (PA) Systems	Low-tech	Emergency vehicles broadcast messages using loudspeakers	Battery-powered
Sirens	Low-tech	Outdoor warning sirens are activated to alert of danger	Power source needed

<b>Notification Method</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Power Requirements</b>
<i>Emergency Alert Systems (EAS)</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Broadcasts on TV and radio</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>NOAA Weather Radio</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Weather related announcements and alerts.</i>	<i>Battery powered NOAA Alert Radio</i>
<i>Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA)</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Text-like messages sent to mobile devices</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>Reverse 911</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Automated phone calls to landlines and registered cellphones</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>Social Media Posts</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Updates posted on official County accounts  Numerous community groups and neighborhood social media accounts and groups</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>Digital Road Signs</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Electronic message boards on major roads</i>	<i>Power source needed (electricity, solar, or battery-powered)</i>
<i>County (and other) Website</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Evacuation information posted on official website</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>

<b>Notification Method</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Power Requirements</b>
<i>Mass Notification Systems</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Text, email, and app notifications</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>Ham Radio Networks</i>	<i>Low-tech</i>	<i>Messages relayed through amateur radio operators. In areas with pre-existing network challenges, Ham radio operators often serve as community notifiers.</i>	<i>Battery-powered</i>
<i>Multi-Use Radio Service (MURS)</i>	<i>Low-tech</i>	<i>Two-way radio service used to communicate with OR3 and local Fire in some communities</i>	<i>Battery-powered</i>
<i>Community Phone Trees</i>	<i>Low-tech</i>	<i>Designated individuals call others in pre-arranged system</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>News Announcements</i>	<i>High-tech</i>	<i>Printed evacuation notices in local papers; Announcements made by TV and radio stations</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>
<i>Flyers/Printed Notices</i>	<i>No-tech</i>	<i>Physical notices posted in public areas</i>	<i>Power source needed</i>

#### **4.4.1 External Communication Considerations**

Effective communication during evacuations requires careful consideration of diverse population needs and varying levels of technological access. ESF #15 is

responsible for public information and warning in SCC and will develop comprehensive communication strategies to address these challenges.

While Zonehaven provides valuable evacuation management tools, zone information is not user-friendly for public communication during preparedness and response phases. Many residents are unfamiliar with their designated zones, and a significant portion of the population may struggle to interpret Zonehaven data effectively. Particularly given the number of zones and sub-zones (200+), “know your zone” campaigns are confusing during “blue sky” days, let alone during an emergency.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, public messaging should focus on easily recognizable geographic references and landmarks rather than zone numbers.

To ensure inclusive communication, *ESF #15: Public Information and Warning/External Affairs* will develop multi-lingual templates for evacuation notices, warnings, and instructions. These templates will be designed for use across no-tech, low-tech, and high-tech communication scenarios, ensuring that critical information reaches all segments of the population regardless of their access to technology. These templates will be available in the *ESF #15: Public Information and Warning/External Affairs Annex* that is scheduled for development [put in completion date].

***Given the county’s topography and power and communications challenges, public messaging should always seek to include the following instructions:***

***“Pass critical emergency information along to neighbors and others when able and safe to do so.”***

Additional information about the County and its infrastructure challenges that may impede communications can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview, Section 2.3.4 Transportation, and Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure.**

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<sup>6</sup> “Know Your Zone” Campaigns originated in hurricane-prone areas. These zones were limited (typically 1-5 zones per area), and were intended for noticed disasters (such as a tropical storm/hurricane). Applicability to the SCC OA is limited and, therefore, this is not a viable public communications strategy.



## Section 5: Re-Entry Procedures

The decision to allow re-entry is made collaboratively by Unified Command (UC) or relevant authorities, with input from County partners and municipalities in impacted areas, based on public health and safety recommendations from various agencies. The Santa Cruz County (SCC) Sheriff's Office, or the agency with jurisdiction in coordination with the EOC and Joint Information Center (JIC) when activated, is responsible for notifying residents when it is safe to return. Before evacuees are allowed to return to their properties, public health and safety, as well as recommendations from the County's Department of Public Health (DPH), Consumer and Environmental Protection Agency (CEPA), law enforcement, and other involved response agencies should be considered.

The decision to allow re-entry will be based on an evaluation of the situation, including the following major factors: Access, threat activity, public health, and whether water and other needed services are operational. Law enforcement manages the re-entry process to ensure it occurs in an orderly and safe manner. Re-entry teams, including members from Community Development and Infrastructure (CDI) Public Works Roads Division, power crews, the medical examiner, fire, and law enforcement, all support the re-entry process.

The procedure remains flexible to accommodate post-disaster conditions, the size and population of the evacuated area, and available resources. Re-entry may be staged by geographic area or for specific purposes, such as retrieval of valuable belongings. Effort must be made throughout the process to minimize danger to returning residents and to provide warnings in accessible formats regarding potentially unsafe areas. Transportation or other support may be required to assist people with disabilities and access and functional needs (DAFN) with safely re-entering. The goal is to facilitate a safe and efficient return of evacuees and property owners, while allowing response and recovery activities to continue.

Before allowing evacuees to permanently return to their homes or workplaces, public health and safety will be prioritized by considering recommendations from the Santa Cruz County Health Services Agency (HSA), CalEPA's Department of Environmental Health (DEH), law enforcement, and other involved response agencies. A series of activities should guide the repopulation process, including

identifying the time, date, and areas for repopulation, determining the type of repopulation (residents, workers, or general public), and assessing other crucial factors, such as the mitigation of threats, the security of power lines, the availability of long-term utility solutions (water and sanitation), and the mitigation of transportation system hazards (cleared roads, inspected bridges, and removed hazardous trees).

*NOTE: The **Santa Cruz County Wildfire Annex** contains detailed information on re-entry and repopulation procedures that are applicable to all evacuation situations.*

## Section 6: Supporting Plans

Plan	Description
SCC OA Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Base Plan	Contains overall policies and procedures for response to emergency situations.  Relevant Sections:  <i>Section 2.3.4.1 Roadways</i>  <i>Section 5.2.1 Field/Initial Response</i>  <i>Section 5.2.3 Mutual Aid</i>  <i>Section 5.7.1 EOC Activation and Deactivation</i>  <i>Section 5.7.1.1 Disaster Duty Officer</i>  <i>Section 5.8 Readiness Working Group</i>  <i>Section 5.9.1 Individuals, Families and Households</i>  <i>Section 6.1.2 Essential Elements of Information</i>  <i>Section 7: Communications &amp; Public Information and Warning</i>  <i>Section 10: County ESFs &amp; EOP Annexes</i>
Santa Cruz County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan	Identifies hazards and threats facing the County and details specific mitigation measures to prevent or reduce the consequences of these hazards.
OR3 Zonehaven SOP	Establishes the management, training, and operations related to the use of the Zonehaven Evacuation Management platform during incidents that require evacuations throughout the county.

Plan	Description
DAFN Registry Use	DAFN registries and information are maintained by PG&E, County HSD, and County HSA. Some information may be accessed by authorized personnel within the SCC OA EOC. Restrictions and use policies are maintained by County Counsel <span style="background-color: yellow;">[verify]</span> .
Santa Cruz County Wildfire Annex	Establishes detailed procedures for response and recovery from wildfires.
Zonehaven Zonebook	Available in both digital and hard copy format. Describes primary and alternate evacuation routes for each Zonehaven zone.
Planning Considerations: Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place: Guidance for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Partners, FEMA, July 2019	Supports state, local, tribal, and territorial partners in planning for evacuation and/or shelter-in-place protective actions.
Integrated Evacuation Planning for Jurisdictions and Individuals with Access and Functional Needs, Cal OES, August 2023	Provides local jurisdictions with guidance, best practices, and informational resources needed to strengthen their plans for the successful evacuation of individuals with disabilities and access and functional needs in disasters.
State of California Alert & Warning Guidelines, May 2024	Contains specific information about alert and warning considerations for individuals with disabilities and access and functional needs.

## Attachment 1: Evacuation Planning Areas (EPAs)

### A1.1 EPA Overview

*Each EPA is designed to be a stand-alone reference, or “tear away” sheet for use during all phases of emergency management.*

For evacuation planning purposes, and to facilitate greater whole community and public understanding, the County has been organized into 16 Evacuation Planning Areas (EPAs).

The EPAs are based on recognizable areas within the County known to most people by common terms. These EPAs are notional and primarily support planners, and support informed decision making. They do not alter or impede evacuation authorities or the use of Zonehaven or other tools used for evacuation management (**See Section 3.1**). [\[hyperlink\]](#)

The EPAs provide details and information to enable more effective, efficient, and equitable evacuations. Given the County’s high risk for no-notice disasters and already stretched public and non-governmental services, pre-planning and major community readiness efforts are essential.

[Exhibit 7: EPA Elements Defined](#) provides a description of key information elements outlined within each EPA.

High resolution map images are available [\[Link to SCC Website once up\]](#).

#### Exhibit 7: EPA Elements Defined

EPA Element	Description
EPA Description	Provides an overarching geographical description of the EPA.
Unique Geographic Area Considerations	Identifies unique geographic characteristics present in the EPA that could influence evacuation. This section also includes areas that may have different authorities.

EPA Element	Description
Fire Agencies within EPA	A list of fire agencies located in the EPA
Law Enforcement Agencies	A list of law enforcement agencies with authority in the EPA
Threats/Hazards	EPA-specific hazard information
Evacuation Strategies	Identifies potential major evacuation routes out of the EPA based on known major hazards in the EPA
Traffic Control Points	Locations where deployment of personnel and/or devices may be necessary to manage the flow of traffic for effective evacuation. These may include intersections, potential bottlenecks, or other areas where access should be restricted.
Disabilities and Access and Functional Needs (DAFN) & Public Information Considerations	Specific considerations based on known DAFN populations within the EPA, to include any public information and communication challenges
Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs)	A list of potential TEP within the EPA. (These sites are resources that may be used for evacuees from other EPAs.)

### A1.2 DAFN Considerations

Some EPAs may have unique populations with DAFN who may need additional assistance and consideration. *For more information, see also EOP Base Plan Sections 2.3.3 – Demographics and Community Considerations.* This includes, but is not limited to:

- Seniors (19.1% of the population is aged 65 and over)

- People with physical, sensory, or cognitive disabilities (12.2% of the population)
- Individuals with chronic health conditions
- Pregnant people
- Children (18.2% under 18 years of age); foster children may have additional needs
- People who identify as members of the LGBTQIA+<sup>7</sup> community
- Persons with Limited English Proficient or Non-English Proficient (LEP/NEP)
- People who are marginalized due to their legal status. This may include migrant agricultural workers, undocumented individuals, and/or criminalized populations.
- People who are digitally disadvantaged
- People who are unhoused or have insecure housing
- People with limited or no transportation options
- People with limited financial means

The county recognizes that socio-economic disparities and intersectional factors greatly influence an individual's vulnerability during emergencies (see **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3.3.8**).

Additional considerations include individuals who rely on durable medical equipment, consumable medical supplies, dialysis, assistive technology, service animals, or personal care assistants; those who may need accessible transportation or other specialized medical equipment; and people who require culturally competent communication and services.

The county is committed to ensuring that historically disadvantaged, marginalized, structurally excluded, and underserved populations benefit from fair and accessible evacuation processes, impartial decision-making, and equitable access to resources and support during emergencies (**EOP Base Plan Section 3.3.3**).

This approach aligns with the county's dedication to diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) in all phases of emergency management, including evacuation planning and execution (**EOP Base Plan Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2**).

**A1.2.1 Livestock Evacuation**

Santa Cruz County is home to numerous farms and ranches that host livestock, and many residents in rural areas maintain livestock for recreation. Over half of the EPAs have significant populations of livestock as shown in **Exhibit 8** below. Evacuation of livestock during emergencies, especially wildfires and floods, is an issue of critical concern.

The County has established a formal relationship with a nonprofit organization, the Santa Cruz County Equine Evacuation Unit, to coordinate emergency livestock evacuations. Working with the Office of Response, Recovery, and Resilience (OR3), the organization organizes evacuations of all types of livestock, not just equine. The Unit is organized geographically, with three coordinators in nine geographic locations along with team leaders and volunteers. Volunteers assist with a range of tasks, including logistics, operations, and financial management, as well as locating and transporting horses and other livestock/large animals away from danger to safe areas.

**Exhibit 8: Livestock Populations by EPA**

<b>EPA</b>	<b>Horses</b>	<b>Cows</b>	<b>Sheep</b>	<b>Pigs</b>	<b>Emu</b>	<b>Alpaca</b>
<b>1</b>		300				
<b>2</b>	347		251	49	2	4
<b>3</b>	318		27	132		
<b>4</b>	353		164	17		12
<b>5</b>	170		81	24		14
<b>6</b>	219		58	25	2	10



<b>9</b>	36		22	14	5	
<b>15</b>	303		99	61	8	34
<b>9, 10</b> <b>(See note)</b>	135		14	2		

Source: Santa Cruz County Equine Evacuation Unit Registry (October 2024)



NOTE: The data source lists animals by zip code. In the source document, zip code 95003 covers portions of EPAs 9 and 10.

### A1.3 EPA Summary List

The following is a list of all EPAs. Maps are available at [\[insert link\]](#).

- Evacuation Planning Area 1 – North Coast
- Evacuation Planning Area 2 – San Lorenzo Valley
- Evacuation Planning Area 3 – Skyline
- Evacuation Planning Area 4 – Bonny Doon
- Evacuation Planning Area 5 – Carbonera/City of Scotts Valley
- Evacuation Planning Area 6 – Summit
- Evacuation Planning Area 7 – City of Santa Cruz
- Evacuation Planning Area 8 – Live Oak/Soquel/City of Capitola
- Evacuation Planning Area 9 – Aptos
- Evacuation Planning Area 10 – Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos
- Evacuation Planning Area 11 – Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell
- Evacuation Planning Area 12 – La Selva
- Evacuation Planning Area 13 – Green Valley/Interlaken
- Evacuation Planning Area 14 – San Andreas/Pajaro Dunes
- Evacuation Planning Area 15 – City of Watsonville
- Evacuation Planning Area 16 – Salsipuedes

Evacuation Planning Area 1 – North Coast



North Coast - 1  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The North Coast Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) is bounded on the north and northeast by San Mateo County, on the northeast by San Lorenzo Valley, on the west by the Pacific Ocean, on the east by the Bonny Doon EPA, and at the southernmost point by the City of Santa Cruz. The topography is primarily mountainous with some flat areas. There are several single ingress/egress roads. Dwellings are widely scattered with no population concentrations of any size. California State Route (SR) 1 hugs the coast for the length of the Area. The only major road is Swanton Road, which runs in a half circle in the southern portion of the Area, intersecting SR 1 at its southern and northern ends.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations

The Big Basin Redwoods State Park is in the Area's northern portion (also within EPA 2). Wilder Ranch State Park and Cotoni-Coast Dairies National Monument are large open spaces within the EPA. The coastline extends from the northern County border to the City of Santa Cruz and is primarily an elevated cliff ranging from 50-feet to 150-feet above the ocean. There are several difficult-to-access small pocket coves and beaches that dot the coast; however, the Greyhound Beach and Fishing Access area provides access to the coast for beachgoers and fishermen.

Many roads in this EPA are private and behind locked gates. This requires emergency services coordination with local property owners or homeowner's associations to ensure access is granted. The Fire and/or Law Enforcement agencies identified below in the EPA have keys to access the majority of these gates.

## 3. Population Numbers

The Area is sparsely populated with less than 300 persons per square mile and a total population of 1,370. The population includes many farm workers employed at the numerous ranches in the area.

## 4. Fire Agencies within EPA 1

Santa Cruz County Fire (SCC Fire) and CAL FIRE

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 1**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff and California State Parks

## **6. Threats**

Except for a few areas along the coast, the entire Area is located in a high hazard fire and landslide zone.

Areas along the creeks are subject to flooding.

Earthquake hazards include the San Gregorio fault (which is just offshore), the San Andreas fault to the east, and the Zayante fault (which extends east/west across much of the northern portion of the Area).

Low-lying areas and scattered beaches along the coast are subject to tsunami inundation and tidal surges due to Pacific storms.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

Evacuation should proceed along minor roads and trails to State Route 1, and then head either north into San Mateo County or south to designated safe areas, depending upon conditions. If persons are directed north, the evacuation should be coordinated with San Mateo County emergency management.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Due to the small population that will be accessing State Route 1, there is no need to deploy traffic control devices or personnel, unless a portion of State Route 1 is wholly or partially impassable.

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Due to the widely scattered population, door-to-door notifications may not be feasible. Residents should be strongly encouraged to participate in Cruz Aware. Cruz Aware (the county's mass notification system) is a digital notification system and reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service, all of which require power service. In this area, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must be considered. A culture of individual preparedness and a readiness to evacuate should be encouraged, as well as the provision of extra support for people with DAFN.



*Additional information about this area and its infrastructure challenges can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview** and, more specifically, in **Section 2.3.4 Transportation and Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure**.*

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 1 that may be used for evacuees within the county are listed below. Evacuees from this area may need to evacuate to TEPs in other areas:

- Wilder Ranch State Park Parking Lot
- Waddell Creek Beach parking lot (near Davenport)

Evacuation Planning Area 2 – San Lorenzo Valley



San Lorenzo Valley - 2  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The San Lorenzo Valley (SLV) Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) is an elongated area roughly bounded on the north by San Mateo County, the west by the EPA 4 Bonny Doon, and on the east by the EPA 3 Skyline, EPA 6 Summit, and EPA 5 Carbonera/Scotts Valley.

The topography is typically mountainous with major streets and population clusters in the valleys. The Lompico and Zayante communities are situated in the eastern portion of EPA 2 San Lorenzo Valley and run along Lompico Road and East Zayante Road, respectively. Much of the population of the Area lies along State Route (SR) 9 in the communities of Boulder Creek, Brookdale, Ben Lomond, Felton, Paradise Park, and Pasatiempo.

Major highways include:

- SR 9, which runs roughly south/southeast, bisecting the Area
- SR 23, which forms a half circle in the northern portion
- Intersection SR 9 at its northern and southern ends
- SR17 in the south connecting with SR 1

Several major streets branch off from these major routes along various valleys. Several critical facilities are located along SR 9.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations

Most of the San Lorenzo Valley EPA contains single ingress and egress (access in/out) neighborhoods with a mix of both public and private roads. Many are single lane winding mountainous roadways that twist around hillsides and trees. Numerous private roads are gated or locked; however, all SLV fire districts have adopted the same Knox Key and have converted all locked gates to Knox padlocks. Cell towers in the area do not have battery backup, so cell service may be degraded or lost during power failures.

Lompico is a mountain community of 450 residences along Lompico Road, which was built in a “box canyon” and requires unique evacuation strategies (see *below*).

This EPA has numerous camps and retreats (formal and informal), which are located in isolated areas throughout the EPA. These camps serve a wide array of ages, abilities, and interests. Population size at these camps can range into the hundreds. These camps include, but are not limited to:

- Quaker Center (Wedding Center) Sequoia Seminar
- Mt. Cross Ministries
- Mt. Herman Camp and Conference Center (Ponderosa Pines/Redwood Camp/Family Conf Ctr)
- YMCA Camp Campbell (16300 Highway 9)
- Easter Seals Camp Harman (16000 Highway 9)
- Camp Krem (102 Brook Lane)

EPA 2 is also home to a significant number of equine and other large livestock populations that require specialized transportation to evacuate.

The Big Basin Redwoods State Park covers a portion of the northwest area (also within EPA 1). Henry Cowell State Park is also located throughout the center of EPA 2 and is home to large old growth redwoods.

### **3. Population Numbers**

Outside of the neighborhoods mentioned above where population densities may reach 1,000 persons per square mile or more, populations densities are typically less than 300 persons per square mile. The total population for EPA 2 is 26,501.

### **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 2**

Santa Cruz County Fire, CAL FIRE, City of Santa Cruz Fire (Paradise Park), Boulder Creek, Ben Lomond, Felton, and Zayante Fire Protection Districts

### **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 2**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff, California State Parks, and City of Santa Cruz Park Rangers



## 6. Threats

Almost the entire area is in a severe fire hazard zone, and there are landslide hazard areas throughout. After major fires, burn areas are subject to debris flows during the rainy season. Debris flows and/or landslides could block main highways SR 9 and SR 236 as well as secondary roads and lanes branching off. In addition to blocking streets and highways, landslides or debris flows blocking or slowing waterways could result in upstream flooding or sudden flash floods downstream.

The Felton Grove area in downtown Felton by the river has one ingress and egress and is subject to flooding. Other areas with limited access include Clear Creek, the Boulder Creek area, and residents along Hopkins Gulch Road. The Paradise Park area is subject to threats from both wildfire and flooding.

Both the San Andreas and Zayante earthquake faults traverse the Area. Many low-lying areas are subject to liquefaction. Of particular concern is land subject to liquefaction along highways SR 9 and SR 236, which could impede evacuation and/or access by emergency vehicles. The Ben Lomond area and south are subject to inundation should the Newell Dam fail or be overtopped.

## 7. Evacuation Strategy

Those evacuating would be directed to proceed to SR 9 and evacuate either north or south, or potentially in both directions depending upon conditions. In the event the flooding, liquefaction, or landslide/debris flows block these routes, residents may be required to shelter in place for some time until roads are cleared.

For Lompico (box canyon), if egress is not available to East Zayante Road anywhere along Lompico Road, then evacuation north to Loch Lomond Recreation Area should be considered.

Similarly, the Zayante area is limited to the use of East Zayante and Upper Zayante Roads for egress. Upper Zayante is a winding mountainous roadway that may require extended drive time.

## 8. Traffic Control Points

There are several potential “choke points” that may require deployment of traffic control personnel and/or devices to keep traffic moving, direct traffic in the correct direction, and restrict access to evacuated areas. These include:

- Both intersections of State Routes 236 and 9
- SR 9 at Bear Creek
- SR 35 at Bear Creek
- SR 9 at Glen Arbor and Lower Glen Arbor
- Intersection at SLV High School
- Felton Intersection (SR 9/Felton Empire Road/Graham Hill Road)
- Jamison Creek at Empire Grade
- Graham Hill Road at Mt. Hermon Road
- East and West Zayante Intersection
- Lompico Road at East Zayante
- East Zayante Road at Quail Hollow Road
- SR 9 at SR 1

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Door-to-door and mobile loudspeaker notifications are feasible in the communities along SR 9. Away from these communities, residents are thinly spread throughout the area.

Where door-to-door notifications are not possible due to private roads behind locked gates or other reasons, residents and visitors should be strongly encouraged to monitor social and broadcast media, as well as participate in Cruz Aware (the county's mass notification system). CruzAware is a digital notification system and reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service—all of which also require power service.

Community radio station KBCZ, located in Boulder Creek, provides information and news to area residents.

In this area, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted. The Area has experienced numerous cellular communication outages or degradations in the past. Landlines are also no longer supported (or are cost prohibitive), further limiting communications capabilities.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures for this area should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*.

The area is home to a large population of seniors and those with disabilities and access and functional needs.

The camps mentioned above serve a diverse range of participants, including those with severe disabilities. The camps can be unknown to County or other officials. Work is in progress to communicate the importance of camp locations, camp dates, and population sizes in case of a no-notice event in a camp area that may require evacuation. Given the potential number of attendees, extra time may be required for successful evacuation of all attendees.

Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered and prioritized throughout the EPA. A culture of individual preparedness and a readiness to evacuate should be encouraged.

Large animal evacuations, to include horses, require specialized transportation and large animal experience. Early notice and action are necessary to allow time for evacuation. The Santa Cruz Horsemen's Association and Equine Evacuation Unit can support evacuations and have strong networks for surge capacity.

Additional information about this area and its infrastructure challenges can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview** and, more specifically, in **Section 2.3.4 Transportation and Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure**.



## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 2 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:

- Loch Lomond (last resort for Lompico area ONLY)
- Safeway Parking Lot
- Roaring Camp

- Highlands County Park
- San Lorenzo Valley High School
- Boulder Creek Golf and Country Club
- Quail Hollow County Park
- Redwood Elementary
- Boulder Creek Elementary
- San Lorenzo Lumber (Felton) Parking Lot
- Camp Maymac/City Team Ministries
- Granite Quarry (405 Quail Hollow Road)

### Evacuation Planning Area 3 – Skyline



Skyline - 3  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



M:\Requests\051-24

## **1. Description**

The Skyline Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) extends along the northeast boundary with Santa Clara County, bordering on EPA 2 San Lorenzo Valley to the west, and EPA 5 Carbonera/City of Scotts Valley and EPA 6 Summit to the south. The topography is primarily mountainous. State Route (SR) 35 follows along the northeast border with Santa Clara County, and State Route 17 extends along the southeast EPA boundary. Upper East Zayante Road (which connects to Route 35 in the north) and Glenwood Drive (which connects to SR 17 in the east) are the only major roads in the Area.

## **2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations**

Although the Skyline EPA is sparsely populated, there are several single egress/ingress roads that wind into the mountainous regions from SR 35 and SR 17 that are populated with single family residences.

## **3. Population Numbers**

The Area is sparsely populated with an average population density of less than 300 persons per square mile. The total population for EPA 3 is 1,550.

## **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 3**

Santa Cruz County Fire, CAL FIRE, and Zayante Fire Protection District

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 3**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

## **6. Threats**

The entire Area is also in a severe fire hazard zone, and there are pockets of landslide hazard zones scattered throughout.

The San Andreas fault extends along the entire length of the Area. There is a severe risk of a damaging earthquake.

## 7. Evacuation Strategy

Evacuees should be directed north to SR 35 and thence to safe areas or east to SR 17. Evacuations should be coordinated with San Mateo County.

### 6.3.8 Traffic Control Points

Traffic control personnel and/or devices should be at the junctions of Upper East Zayante Road at SR 35, and Glenwood Drive and SR 17.

## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

Due to the widely scattered population, door-to-door notifications may not be feasible. Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media sources as well as participate in Cruz Aware (the county's mass notification system). CruzAware is a digital notification system and reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service—all of which require power service.

In this area, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted.


There are a number of active homeowner associations in the area that share information with members, and the area enjoys a high level of citizen preparedness, including an active Community Emergency Response Team (CERT). Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must be considered. A culture of individual preparedness and readiness to evacuate should be encouraged.

Additional information about this area and its infrastructure challenges can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview** and, more specifically, in **Section 2.3.4 Transportation** and **Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure**.

## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points

There are no adequate Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) within EPA 3. Evacuating residents should be directed to safe areas outside the EPA.

**Evacuation Planning Area 4 – Bonny Doon**



Bonny Doon - 4  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)





## **1. Description**

The Bonny Doon Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) is bounded on the west by the EPA 1 North Coast; on the east by EPA 2 San Lorenzo Valley; and on the south by EPA 7 City of Santa Cruz. The terrain is primarily mountainous and cuts through several valleys and waterways. Major streets include Empire Grade, which runs the full length of the Area beginning at Jamison Creek Road in the northwest and extends to the City of Santa Cruz in the southeast portion of the Area. Alba and Felton Empire Roads connect Empire Grade to State Route 9 to the east, and Bonny Doon Road connects with State Route 1 to the south.

## **2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations**

Many neighborhoods in the area have single ingress/egress points, served by a mix of public and private roads. Routes are sometimes narrow, winding, and have challenging terrain. Private roads may be gated or locked, requiring emergency services to coordinate with local property owners or homeowner's associations to ensure access. In most (but not all) cases, the fire and/or law enforcement agencies identified below in the EPA have keys to access the gates. Due to periodic power outages, many homes are equipped with emergency generators.

The Wilder Ranch State Park lies in the southernmost portion of the Area, bordered by the Pacific Ocean and the City of Santa Cruz.

## **3. Population Numbers**

The Area is sparsely populated, with Bonny Doon being the only community of any size with a population of about 2,800. The total population for EPA 4 is 3,232 and includes many seniors.

## **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 4**

Santa Cruz County Fire, CAL FIRE, Boulder Creek and Felton Fire Protection Districts

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 4**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff and California State Parks

## 6. Threats

The entire area is under threat from wildfires, and there are scattered pockets of landslide zones scattered throughout the Area.

Some coastal areas may be subject to tsunami inundation.

Severe earthquake threats are posed by the nearby San Andreas fault to the east, the San Gregorio fault offshore, and the Zayante fault at the northern edge of the Area. A small area below Smith Grade is subject to possible liquefaction, as are several places along the coast.

## 7. Evacuation Strategy

The evacuation strategy is to direct evacuees east to State Route 9 along Alba and Felton Empire roads, and/or south along Empire Grade or Bonny Doon Road to State Route 1.

*Note: These roads may be limited due to weather, road issues, or other conditions, and they are subject to sudden changes as a result of wind, downed trees, and snow.*

## 8. Traffic Control Points

Traffic control personnel and/or devices should be deployed at the following intersections:

- Alba Road at Empire Grade
- Alba Road at State Route 9
- Felton Road at Empire Grade
- Felton Road at State Route 9
- Bonny Doon Road at State Route 1
- Smith Grade at Empire Grade

## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

In this area, evacuation notification methods may vary depending on population density and infrastructure. In more densely populated communities along the

main routes, door-to-door notifications and mobile loudspeaker announcements may be effective.

In areas where residents are sparsely distributed or live on private roads with restricted access, alternative notification methods are necessary. Residents in these hard-to-reach areas should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media sources as well as participate in Cruz Aware, the county's mass notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system and is reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service—all of which require power service.

Communication in the area can be problematic, with cellular coverage often unreliable and subject to frequent outages or service degradations—particularly during emergencies. Landlines are also no longer supported (or are cost prohibitive), further limiting communications capabilities.



Early evacuation warnings and orders will be important in this EPA. A culture of individual preparedness and readiness to evacuate should be encouraged.

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 4 that may be used for evacuees within the County include, but are not limited to:

- Crest Tree Ranch
- Bonny Doon Airport

**Evacuation Planning Area 5 – Carbonera/City of Scotts Valley**



Carbonera/City of Scotts Valley - 5  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The Carbonera/City of Scotts Valley Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) lies in the center of the County, bordered by EPA 2 San Lorenzo Valley, EPA 3 Skyline, EPA 6 Summit, and EPA 7 City of Santa Cruz. The Area is characterized by medium density urban population clusters along State Route (SR) 17, which bisects the Area running north/south from Santa Cruz (in the south to Los Gatos and San Jose to the north). The incorporated City of Scotts Valley is situated along SR 17. Several major streets intersect with SR 17, including Pasatiempo Drive, El Rancho Drive, La Madrona Drive, Mt. Hermon, Granite Creek and Vine Hill roads. Bean Creek Road, Scotts Valley Drive, and Glenwood Drive roughly parallel SR 17 to the west. East of SR 17, Branciforte Drive winds along Branciforte Creek in a north/south direction. East and west of SR 17, the topography is mountainous and populated with numerous isolated dwellings and small clusters of residential uses.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations

The Area contains numerous two-lane roads (some unpaved) that wind through the mountains to provide access to scattered residents. The Old Pilkington Road Area is of particular concern from an evacuation standpoint due to the presence of private roads that may be gated or otherwise blocked. There are also several campsites located in the Area that may require evacuation assistance.

- Camp Recovery (addiction)
- Juvenile Detention Center
- 1440 Multiversity Center
- Happy Valley Conference Center
- Mission Springs Youth Camp
- Redwood Glen Camp
- Twin Lakes Church at Mt. Hermon Camp
- Salvation Army Camp on Bean Creek

## 3. Population Numbers

The total population for EPA 5 is 20,302, of which the incorporated City of Scotts Valley represents more than 11,000 people.

## **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 5**

Scotts Valley, Branciforte, and Zayante Fire Protection Districts, Santa Cruz County Fire and CAL FIRE

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff, City of Scotts Valley Police Department, California State Parks

## **6. Threats**

The entire Area is in a Wildfire Severe Hazard Zone and there are pockets of landslide hazard zones throughout the Area, some being immediately adjacent to populated areas in and around Scotts Valley. In addition, post-wildfire burn areas are subject to debris flows, which can block roads or creeks and threaten residential structures.

Bean Creek and Branciforte Creek are subject to flooding, which could potentially render Bean Creek Road and Bean Road impassable in various locations.

The Zayante and San Andreas earthquake faults are immediately north of the Area and pose severe earthquake hazards. Most of the densely populated areas west of SR 17 are subject to liquefaction that may occur because of a strong earthquake.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

For a wildfire evacuation, residents should be directed to SR 17 and then north or south, depending upon the status of the fire danger.

If unusually heavy rain is anticipated, residents along the creeks may be advised to evacuate in advance. In case of flash floods, residents in those locations may be advised to seek higher ground and shelter-in-place until assistance can arrive or the danger has passed.

Likewise, if a severe earthquake causes SR 17 or other major roads to become impassable, residents may be advised to temporarily shelter-in-place.

Depending upon the specific situation, residents along Granite Creek and Branciforte roads may be directed to evacuate directly south, instead of attempting to reach SR 17.

Persons living west of SR 17 and south of Mt. Hermon Road may be directed to Graham Hill Road to proceed south to the City of Santa Cruz.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

In case of a large-scale evacuation, traffic control personnel, signage or other traffic control measures may be needed at SR 17 interchanges.

- Along Mt. Hermon
- Granite Creek/Glenwood
- Granite Creek/SR 17 (in front of church)

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

This EPA has a significant senior population, including those residing in senior assisted living facilities and mobile home parks. Many have mobility issues, cognitive impairments, or medical needs that require special attention during evacuation. Outreach strategies in the area will need to account for populations that may not be signed up to receive alerts. Additionally, seniors living alone or in isolated areas may be at higher risk during emergencies and will require additional outreach. There are also two large manufactured/mobile home communities for senior living that may require additional time or special resources during an evacuation.

Door-to-door and mobile loudspeaker notifications are feasible in the communities along SR 17. Away from these communities, residents are spread throughout the area and may be located off long winding roads or behind locked gates.

Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media outlets and participate in Cruz Aware, the county's mass notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system and is reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service—all of which require power service.

In this area, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness and readiness to evacuate should be encouraged.

Additional information about this area and its infrastructure challenges can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview** and, more specifically, in **Section 2.3.4 Transportation** and **Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure**.



## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 5 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:

- Scotts Valley High
- Skypark
- Target (Mt. Hermon)
- Nob Hill
- Happy Valley School
- Siltanen Community Park
- Gateway Church
- Park and Ride (Kings Village)
- Hilton Hotel
- Sheraton Four Points Hotel
- Pasatiempo Golf Course
- 1440 Multiversity Center



**Evacuation Planning Area 6 – Summit**



Summit - 6  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The Summit Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) is located in the east central portion of the county, on the border with Santa Clara County. The Area is sparsely populated, with the highest concentrations in the extreme northwestern area. Highland Way and Summit Road traverse the Area adjacent and near to the border with Santa Clara County.

Most of the area population is located along Soquel San Jose and Laurel Glen roads, which run north/south along the western edge and on a network of minor streets in the medium density populated area in the northwest corner between State Route (SR) 17 and Summit Road. As with much of Santa Cruz County, the topography is mostly mountainous.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations

EPA 6 has neighborhoods with limited access, often having limited ingress and egress points served by a mix of public and private roads. Many of the routes are narrow, winding, and mountainous roadways. Private roads in the area may be gated or locked, requiring coordination between emergency services and local residents prior to an evacuation.

The Soquel Demonstration State Forest occupies approximately 2,600 acres in the southeastern portion of the Area. Seasonal use of the Demo Forest can be very high, with hundreds of hikers and mountain bikers. Emergency notifications to these visitors can be difficult due to poor cellular coverage and a widely dispersed population.

A large radio antenna is in the area. (location from Radio Shop)

- St. Claire's Retreat

## 3. Population Numbers

Total population for EPA 6 is 4,419.

## 4. Fire Agencies within EPA 6

Santa Cruz County Fire, CAL FIRE, and Central Fire Protection District

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 6**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff and California State Parks

## **6. Threats**

The entire area is subject to severe wildfire hazards. Post wildfire burn areas may be subject to debris flows during rainy seasons, endangering residential structures and potentially blocking roads or waterways.

Much of the area is subject to landslides.

The entire Area is subject to severe shaking from a major earthquake. The Zayante Fault traverses east/west through the center of the Area, and the San Andreas Fault traverses the Area along the northeast border directly adjacent to the populated areas below Summit Road.

The area along Soquel San Jose Road is subject to liquefaction, as well as to flooding from Burns Creek.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

Potential evacuation options are limited. Residents who have access to SR 17 should be directed to evacuate either north toward San Jose or south to Santa Cruz, depending upon conditions.

Persons residing east of SR 17 could potentially take Soquel San Jose Road south to Santa Cruz.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

The intersection of Summit Road and SR 17 may experience congestion during evacuation and may need to have traffic control personnel onsite to direct traffic.

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Due to the widely scattered population, door-to-door notifications may not be feasible. Private roads and locked gates may also pose notification challenges. Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media outlets and participate in Cruz Aware, the county's mass

notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system that is reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service—all of which also require power service.

In this area, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted. The Area has experienced numerous cellular communication outages or degradations in the past. Landlines are also no longer supported (or are cost prohibitive), further limiting communications capabilities.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness and readiness to evacuate should be encouraged.


Additional information about this area and its infrastructure challenges can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview** and, more specifically, in **Section 2.3.4 Transportation** and **Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure**.

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 6 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:

- Locatelli Ranch
- Millpond Lake
- Olive Springs Quarry
- Summit Store
- Loma Prieta School and Community Center

Evacuation Planning Area 7 – City of Santa Cruz



City of Santa Cruz - 7  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) 7 represents the City of Santa Cruz, the largest incorporated city in the county. The city is bounded on the north primarily by EPA 5 Carbonera/City of Scotts Valley EPA; by the Pacific Ocean (Monterey Bay) in the south; to the east by EPA 8 Live Oak/Soquel/Capitola Area; and to the west by EPA 4 Bonny Doon.

The city is bisected into the “west side” and “east side” by the San Lorenzo River. The topography is generally flat to rolling, with hill areas in the west and northwest areas. State Routes (SR) 9 and 17 terminate in the city, intersecting with State Route 1. SR 1 traverses the city east/west. The street pattern is varied rather than a typical “grid” pattern due to topography.

North/south arterials include Bay Street, Seabright Avenue, Chestnut Street, River/Front Street, and Ocean Street. East/west arterials include Soquel Avenue, Laurel/Broadway, and Water Street—all of which bridge the San Lorenzo River.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Considerations

The city represents the County seat for Santa Cruz County.

The University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) is located in the southwestern quadrant of the city. The University and several residential areas to the west and northwest portions of the city are located in Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) areas. [\(Hyperlink to Special Areas\)](#)

Approximately 99% of the Santa Cruz County Port Harbor is located within the city. The Port is governed by the Santa Cruz Port District, a special district created under state authority that is independent of the City and County. [\(Hyperlink to Special Areas\)](#)

The Monterey National Marine Sanctuary and the iconic Santa Cruz Boardwalk are also located within the City’s boundaries.

## 3. Population Numbers

The total population for the City of Santa Cruz is approximately 62,000.

The city is also subject to major population fluctuations. During peak tourism in summer, the population exceeds 100,000.

The UCSC total on-campus population number can exceed 20,000 during the academic year (September-June). UCSC also hosts summer conferences and student orientation, which can draw on campus populations of 5,000 to 7,000.

#### **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 7**

City of Santa Cruz Fire Department

#### **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 7**

City of Santa Cruz Police Department and UCSC Police Department

#### **6. Threats**

Severe fire hazard areas extend into the city to the west and north. There are pockets of residential areas in the western part of the city that are in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) that are endangered by wildfires in the area.

Much of the coastal area is within the Tsunami Hazard Zone, which extends inland as far as SR 1 along the San Lorenzo River in the Twin Lakes area, and in the Natural Bridge area to the west.

Much of the same area is within the 100-year flood zone, which also extends further north along the San Lorenzo River and Arana Gulch, which feeds into Woods Lagoon.

The Harbor is subject to tsunami and flooding.

The Beachflats Neighborhood located in front of the Boardwalk is also susceptible to levee break. In the event of a levee failure, the entire neighborhood would be inundated.

The San Lorenzo River mouth is subject to narrowing due to sand from storms and other events. Mitigation strategies to remove sand and debris appear to help.

A small landslide hazard area exists in the northern most area of the city.

The San Andreas and Zayante faults lie to the northeast of the city, resulting in large areas of the city being subject to liquefaction.

#### **7. Evacuation Strategy**

Note: The city has its own evacuation plan and strategy [\[verify\]](#).

Evacuation from the Port would likely be a combination of auto and foot traffic and would need to be coordinated with the City to establish evacuation routes and assembly points. Additional details about the Port's Evacuation can be found in Special Areas in the Santa Cruz Port District/Santa Cruz Small Craft Harbor [\(insert hyperlink\)](#).

### **Flood and Tsunami**

Residents and visitors in the immediate coastal area should be directed to evacuate north by any available route. Persons in the inland areas subject to flooding/tsunami inundation along the San Lorenzo River would be directed to evacuate east and/or west along using Broadway/Laurel, Soquel and Water Streets.

There are few, if any, residential structures in the Twin Lakes area. Evacuees would likely be recreational users who could evacuate via several street or by foot, if necessary.

### **Wildfire**

In the event of wildfire threatening areas of the city, field command would identify safe evacuation routes based on the size and direction of the fire.

In the far northwest area between Wilder Ranch and Henry Crowell State Parks, evacuation would probably proceed south on Empire Grade or Coolidge Drive. Threatened areas in the southwest would likely use Bay Street, High Street, or Delaware Avenue.

Evacuation of threatened areas in the north would likely be directed south along SR 17, Paul Sweet Road, North Rodeo Gulch Road, Graham Hill Road, and/or Granite Creek Road.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Traffic control points would be established as required--particularly at points where outlets from several residential areas intersect main evacuation routes, such as the Scotts Valley/Mt. Hemon intersection or the Mt. Hermon/SR 17 interchange.



## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

Despite being the largest incorporated city in the County, the city experiences communication challenges and, in some areas, internet connectivity issues persist.

Various segments of the population have different access to and rely on and receive their information in different modalities. Consideration needs to account for low tech (personal and service networks) to high tech as well as the wide variety of popular social media outlets.

For example, the city is also home to the largest black population in the county. Trusted networks and neighbor-to-neighbor networks are essential for getting out notifications and updates.

Further, significant unhoused populations exist within the city [obtain additional information]. Many people who are unhoused access services and mailboxes within the city through the County Health Services Agency (HSA) and other programs [verify].

The Santa Cruz County Main Jail and the Blaine Street Women's Facility (minimum security correctional facility) are also located within the Area. [get details and communications/evacuation considerations]

[See Special Areas: Santa Cruz Port District/Santa Cruz Small Craft Harbor].

[See Special Areas: University of California Santa Cruz]

## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 7 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:



All-Hazard TEPs:

- Civic Auditorium
- Depot Park
- Vets Hall

Tsunami TEPs:

- Beach Hill
- Dream Inn Parking Lot

Evacuation Planning Area 8 – Live Oak/Soquel/City of Capitola



Live Oak/Soquel/City of Capitola - 8  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) 8 lies along the Monterey Bay coast, adjacent to the EPA 7 City of Santa Cruz on the west, the Seacliff community on the east, and mountainous areas to the north. The EPA includes the incorporated City of Capitola and the unincorporated communities of Live Oak, Soquel, and Twin Lakes.

Arana Gulch forms the western border. Soquel and Rodeo Creeks trisect the Area from the mountains in the north draining into the bay. State Route (SR) 1 and Soquel Drive (including Soquel Ave south of SR 1) provide for east/west circulation across the entire Area. Porter Gulch and North Rodeo Gulch roads extend from Soquel Drive into the northern portions of the Area, as does Soquel San Jose Road, which extends to the coast. North of SR 1, there are pockets of residential areas in the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI).

The majority of the population hugs the coast below Soquel Drive. There is, however, considerable scattered residential land use in the foothills and mountains to the north, including a campground and several group residential facilities.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

Other than Soquel Drive and SR 1, the lack of vehicle bridges across Soquel and Rodeo creeks effectively divides the area south of SR 1 into three distinct geographic areas. Likewise, the limited number of streets that cross SR 1 somewhat separate the Soquel community north of the highway from the rest of the Area. There are several communities that extend north from Soquel Drive that reach back deeply into the Soquel hills. Some of those communities are along Thurber Lane, N. Rodeo Gulch Road, Main Street/Glen Haven Road, Fairway Drive, and Porter Gulch Road. Each of these communities consists of several hundred homes, which have a limited means of egress, and many have a single egress route. There are also several low-income housing sites throughout EPA 8.

Several beaches and roadways are at or very near sea level, and no bluffs or barriers exist to protect homes or roads, including Capitola Village.

This Area also contains the greatest concentration of senior living communities in the county, as well as mobile home parks and assisted living facilities. EPA 8 has

the greatest number of skilled nursing facilities, mental health treatment centers, and medical facilities.

- Dominican Oaks
- Janus Residential
- Behavioral Health
- Dominican Hospital
- Sutter Maternity and Surgical Center
- Camp Kennolyn
- Land of Medicine Budha

### **3. Population Numbers**

Total population for EPA 8 is 47,654, nearly 10,000 of whom are located within the City of Capitola.

### **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 8**

Central Fire Protection District

### **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 8**

City of Capitola Police Department, California State Parks, and Santa Cruz County Sheriff

### **6. Threats**

#### **Tidal Surge/Flooding**

Areas along Arana Gulch, Rodeo Creek, and Soquel Creek are subject to flooding primarily from rainstorms, with the possibility of tsunami inundation along the coast. These creeks are narrow in many sections and may be blocked by debris flows or fallen trees.

In the Pleasure Point area, extending west to Arana Gulch, the tsunami inundation zone reaches several blocks inland, endangering residential neighborhoods as far north as Portola Drive. Several beaches and roadways are at sea level and are

especially vulnerable to coastal surges. Lagoons and bodies of water in the Live Oak area are prone to flooding during heavy rain and tidal surges.

Capitola Village is heavily impacted by large tidal events and faces a high risk of flooding if debris, such as fallen trees, is not promptly cleared from upstream creeks, which can obstruct the waterway.

Soquel Creek, which is located just north of Capitola Village, is susceptible to both rain-driven flooding and coastal surges, as it is impacted by the creek and the ocean.

East of the creek, the area around Soquel Creek is prone to flooding due to its narrow channel and coastal proximity.

### **Fire**

Much of the area north of Soquel Drive is in a Fire Hazard Severity Zone (e.g., significant wildfire risk).

### **Earthquake/Liquefaction**

As with much of the county, the area is vulnerable to earthquake damage, particularly from the San Andreas and Zayante faults.

Most of the region south of Soquel Drive faces a "low" risk of liquefaction. Developed areas along Soquel Creek, including densely populated parts of Capitola, have a "moderate" to "very high" risk of liquefaction.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

### **Wildfire**

The overarching strategy would be to direct evacuees south along streets that cross under or over SR 1.

**West of Rodeo Creek:** South on 17th Avenue and/or Chanticleer Avenue

**East of Rodeo Creek to Soquel Creek:** South on Rodeo Gulch Road; 41st Street; Robertson Street; and/or Soquel San Jose Road/Porter Street

**East of Soquel Creek:** South on Main Street to Porter Street; Capitola Avenue; and/or Park Avenue

### **Flood/Tsunami**

The overarching strategy is to evacuate people north from the flood/inundation areas.

**West of Rodeo Creek:** 7th Avenue to Capitola, 17th to Brommer Street

**Pleasure Point area:** Neighborhood streets to Portola, then north on 30th or 41st streets

**East of Soquel Creek:** North on Laurence Avenue, north on Bay Street to Park Avenue, then northeast

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Potential intersections that may require deployment of traffic control personnel or devices are listed below. However, determination of which, if any, will require traffic control will be made based upon the incident.

### **Wildfire**

- 17th Avenue at Soquel Drive
- Chanticleer Avenue at Soquel Drive
- N. Rodeo Gulch Road at Soquel Drive
- Robertson Street at Soquel Drive
- 41st Street at Soquel Drive
- Porter Street at Soquel Drive
- Main Street at Soquel Drive
- Capitola at Soquel Drive
- Park Avenue at SR 1 interchange
- Porter Street at SR 1 interchange

### **Tsunami/flood**

- 7th Avenue at Brommer Street
- 17th Avenue at Capitola Street
- Portola Street at 30th Avenue
- Bay Street at Laurence Avenue
- Bat Street at Park Avenue

## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

Capitola is a popular tourist destination and hosts thousands of visitors, especially in the summer months. Capitola Village caters to tourists. There are many businesses and shops.

Visitors to the area may not be familiar with the various alerting mechanisms and evacuation routes within the EPA. Special consideration should be given to informing non-residents of evacuation information, such as by using digital signage on roadways. Messaging should be accessible to everyone, which also means it needs to be available in multiple languages to account for visitors whose first language may not be English.

This EPA houses the greatest density of senior living areas **[obtain additional detail if available]** as well as medical facilities. Early emergency notifications will be needed, and additional evacuation resources may be required.

## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 8 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:

All-Hazard TEPs:

- Capitola Mall
- 7<sup>th</sup> Day Adventist
- Soquel High
- Cabrillo College
- Twin Lakes Church



Tsunami TEPs:

- Felt Street Park
- Capitola Mall
- El Rancho Shopping Center
- Santa Cruz Hope Church
- Jade Street Recreation Center



- New Brighton Middle School
- Twin Lakes Church

Evacuation Planning Area 9 – Aptos



Aptos - 9  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The Aptos Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) lies along Monterey Bay. EPA 8 Capitola/Live Oak/Soquel is to the west. EPA 11 Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell and EPA 12 La Selva are to the east, and EPA 6 Summit is to the north. State Route (SR) 1 traverses the southern portion of the Area in a southeast to northwest direction. The Area includes Aptos, Rio Del Mar, Seacliff, and Rob Roy Junction. The topography below SR 1 is a combination of flat areas and rolling hills. Above SR 1, the topography rapidly becomes mountainous, with numerous canyons and narrow valleys. The Area continues the urbanized pattern of the Capitola area to the west, with most of the population residing below SR 1, but with a substantial numbers of residents living to the north in widely scattered locations.

SR 1 and Soquel Drive are the only thoroughfares that run completely through the Area. Above and below SR 1, the street pattern is characterized by a mostly non-grid, meandering pattern. Soquel Drive roughly parallels SR 1 in the central and western portions of the Area, running to the north side of the highway and providing connections to numerous local streets.

Several streets follow canyons and valleys up into the mountains, serving residents residing in those areas. This includes Cathedral Drive, Burns Creek Road, Trout Gulch Road, Fern Flat and Baker Road among others.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

The mountainous areas above SR 1 pose challenges to evacuation since many are winding, two-lane roads with limited connectivity to Soquel Drive or SR 1. Of special concern is Cathedral Drive, which winds through a canyon subject to liquefaction and provides the only access for numerous residents.

The stretch of Soquel Drive and SR 1 between Rio Del Mar and Freedom boulevards, including the Freedom Boulevard/SR 1 interchange, are also of concern. Liquefaction could result in severe damage, forcing closure of the main east-west arteries and/or access to an important access road into mountain residential areas.

The northern section of the area is home to Nisene Marks State Park, which occupies roughly one-third of the total land area.

There is a small pocket of businesses and vacation homes north of Seacliff State Beach. The vacation homes are partially occupied year-round.

### **3. Population Numbers**

Total population for EPA 9 is 18,532.

### **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 9**

Central Fire Protection District

### **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 9**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff and California State Parks

### **6. Threats**

Most of the area above SR 1 lies within a Fire Hazard Zone.

The immediate coastline is subject to tsunami inundations as well as tidal surge resulting from Pacific storms. Tsunami waters, however, could inundate inland areas adjacent to Aptos Creek as far north as Soquel Drive. Most of the immediate coastline that is subject to tsunami inundation is not inhabited with permanent residents; however, the Rio Del Mar flats area west of Moosehead Drive near the Aptos Creek outfall could be completely inundated.

Aptos Creek is prone to flooding when debris collects and clogs the waterway.

As with most of the county, the Aptos Area could be affected by a major earthquake on the San Andreas or Zayante faults. Much of the Area is classified as “low” liquefaction potential, with it being “high” to “very high” along the creeks and canyons, as well as the Rio Del Mar neighborhood west of Moosehead Drive near the Aptos Creek mouth.

### **7. Evacuation Strategy**

#### **Wildfire**

Rapid evacuation from mountain areas along narrow two-lane roads is difficult at best. The potential for disabled vehicles and congestion at intersecting roads will further inhibit vehicle movement. Authorities should consider ordering evacuation of these areas well before they are in immediate danger if possible.

### **Tsunami and Tidal Surge**

Residents along the southern portion of Aptos Creek should be ordered to evacuate upon a Tsunami warning using Moosehead Drive, Aptos Beach Road, or Rio Del Mar.

### **Earthquake**

A major earthquake could render mountain roads through the canyons impassable due to debris or liquefaction. Residents in these areas should be strongly advised to be prepared to shelter-in-place for an extended period until roads can be reopened.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Potential intersections that may require deployment of traffic control personnel or devices are listed below. However, determination of which (if any) will require traffic control will be made depending upon the incident.

### **Tsunami**

- Rio Del Mar Boulevard at Cliff Drive
- Moosehead Drive at Treasure Island Avenue
- Aptos Beach Boulevard at Rio Del Mar

### **Wildfire**

- Soquel Drive at Aptos Creek Road
- Soquel Drive at Trout Gulch Road
- Soquel Drive at Mar Vista
- Cathedral/Yoshiko Way at Trout Gulch Road
- Rio Del Mar/Soquel Drive/Highway 1 interchange
- Valencia Road at Trout Gulch Road

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Door-to-door and mobile loudspeaker notifications are feasible in the communities near the Aptos Village. Those who are deaf or hard of hearing will require alternate messaging. Away from these communities, residents are thinly spread throughout the area.

Where door-to-door notification is not possible (in part due to private roads behind locked gates), these persons should be encouraged to monitor Cruz Aware, as well as trusted social media and commercial media, for evacuation instructions. However, Cruz Aware is a digital notification system and reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service (all of which require power service). In some areas, such as those bordering Nisene Marks State Park, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted. The Area has experienced numerous cellular communications outages or degradations in the past. Landlines are also no longer supported (or are cost prohibitive), further limiting communications capabilities.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness, readiness to evacuate, and shelter-in-place should be encouraged.

For the vacation homes along Seacliff State Beach, seasonal and visiting renters may not be aware of CruzAware alerts and warnings disseminated via emergency communications systems. Additional outreach, to include informational postings in rental facilities, should be considered.

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 9 that may be used for evacuees within the County include, but are not limited to:

### **All-Hazard TEPs**


- Safeway parking lot at Rancho del Mar Shopping Center
- Seacliff State Beach Upper Parking Lot
- Deer Park Marketplace Parking lot

### **Tsunami TEPs**

- Seacliff State Beach Upper Parking Lot

- Polo Grounds
- Deer Park Marketplace Parking Lot

**Evacuation Planning Area 10 – Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos**



Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos - 10  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)





## 1. Description

The Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) is a fully unincorporated area of the county and lies inland, northwest of Watsonville. State Route (SR) 1 forms the southeastern boundary of the Area. EPA 9 Aptos is adjacent to the west, EPA 11 Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell to the north, and EPA 13 Green Valley/Interlaken to the east. The terrain is generally hilly, except for portions of the eastern and southeastern areas.

The Area is sparsely populated with scattered residential uses throughout, with the heaviest concentration being the Freedom community adjacent to the Watsonville Municipal Airport. Other communities in the Area include Day Valley in the north, Aptos Hills in the mid area, and Larkin Valley in the south. Principal roadways include White Road, Hames Road, Larkin Valley Road, Freedom Boulevard, Corralitos Road, and Day Valley Road.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

The Area has a diverse topography, which can create a patchwork of microclimates. Although some areas are well-connected, there are areas where access is limited. Some neighborhoods and individual properties may be served by narrow, winding roads that can be difficult to navigate. In some cases, these roads may only have one ingress/egress route.

Many people in the area have horses. Evacuation strategies for equine and livestock should be considered, in conjunction with the Santa Cruz County Equine Evac and OR3.

The Buena Vista Landfill and Santa Cruz County Rountree Medium Facility are both located in close proximity (less than a mile) along Buena Vista Drive. Rountree is a male-only medium-security County Jail operated by the Sheriff's Office. The facility has a maximum capacity of 96 inmates. [\[get details and communications/evacuation considerations\]](#). Other facilities in the area include Aptos Pines mobile home park, Aldridge County Park, Corralitos Grange, and the county CHP station.

## 3. Population Numbers

Total population for EPA 10 is 9,211.

## **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 10**

Central Fire Protection District, Santa Cruz County Fire, and CAL FIRE

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 10**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

## **6. Threats**

The western and northern portions of the Area are within fire hazard zones and at severe risk of wildfire.

The Zayante fault zone passes through the northeastern corner and the San Andreas fault passes just a few miles to the east. Most of the Area is subject to some liquefaction.

A section of Freedom Boulevard, which is south of the intersection with White Road, is prone to flooding on the south side and landslides on the north side. This same section, extending to the White Road intersection, is also rated as having a “high” potential for liquefaction. Any of these conditions could render Freedom Boulevard impassable. Additionally, a portion of Larkin Road is at risk of closure due to a potential landslide area adjacent to its north side.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

Wildfire evacuation decisions will depend upon the location and direction of the fire. Wildfire evacuation could be directed southeast to SR 1 and then north toward Santa Cruz or south toward Watsonville; or it could be directed to the east to Freedom Boulevard and then east or south to unaffected areas.

Persons living in remote canyon areas may need to shelter-in-place for some time following a major earthquake due to road closures due to debris, downed trees, or landslides.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Due to the low population density, traffic control points may not be required.

## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

Communications can be inconsistent throughout the area, with some locations experiencing poor connectivity. Cell phone coverage can be spotty and internet access may be limited in certain pockets, necessitating alternative communication strategies during emergencies.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness, readiness to evacuate, and shelter-in-place should be encouraged.



Large animal evacuations, including horses, require specialized transportation and large animal experience. Early notice and action are necessary to allow time for evacuation. The Santa Cruz Horsemen's Association and Equine Evacuation Unit can support evacuations and have strong networks for surge capacity.

## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 10 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:

- Aptos High
- Polo Grounds
- Forest and Meadows Neighborhood
- Calabasas Elementary parking lot
- Corralitos Lagoon parking lot
- Grange Hall parking garage

**Evacuation Planning Area 11 – Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell**



Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell - 11  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) 11 Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell lies in the southeast portion of the county, along the border with Santa Clara County. To the north, west and south, it borders EPA 6 Summit, EPA 9 Aptos, EPA 10 Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos, and EPA 16 Salsipuedes.

The area is very sparsely populated with widely scattered residential properties throughout. Access is provided by winding roads through narrow canyons, including Browns Valley, Eureka Canyon, Hazel Dell, Mt. Madonna, and Buzzard Lagoon roads. Summit Road hugs the border with Santa Clara County. There are a number of unhused camps and motor homes located along Summit Road.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

This area is characterized by its rugged, mountainous terrain and sparse population. The topography is dominated by a series of mountains, canyons, steep hillsides, and narrow valleys.

Access to the area is provided by a network of winding roads that snake through the canyons and along ridgelines. Roads are subject to failures in winter due to weather-related challenges. Fallen trees are common occurrences, resulting in sudden, temporary road blockages.

## 3. Population Numbers

The total population for EPA 11 is 1,578.

## 4. Fire Agencies within EPA 11

Santa Cruz County Fire and CAL FIRE

## 5. Law Enforcement Agencies

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

## 6. Threats

The principal threats facing this area are wildfires and earthquakes. The entire area is in a wildfire hazard zone.

The San Andreas fault runs through the entire length of the Area, with the Zayante fault immediately adjacent. The location astride the San Andreas fault poses the possibility of a catastrophic seismic event, which could cause significant damage to structures, roadways, communications infrastructure, and electrical power.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

The keys to a successful wildfire evacuation in this Area are advance preparation and awareness on the part of residents and early warning. Narrow, winding roads are also subject to sudden weather-related blockages, downed trees, or rock/landslides.

Evacuating residents are not likely to encounter excessive congestion on evacuation routes within the Area but may encounter congestion when joining other evacuees as they pass through adjoining EPAs toward safety.

Both Eureka Canyon and Buzzard Lagoon roads pass through areas subject to landslides and may be impassable after a strong earthquake along the San Andreas or Zayante faults.

Residents should be prepared to shelter-in-place for some time until roads are cleared.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Due to low population density, traffic control points during an evacuation of the Area's population may not be required. However, control points may be necessary due to traffic flowing from other areas

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Due to the widely scattered population, door-to-door notifications are not feasible. Private roads and locked gates may also pose notification challenges. Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media sources and participate in CruzAware the county's mass notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system and reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service--all of which require power service.

In pockets of this area, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted. The Area has experienced numerous cellular communications outages or degradations in the past. Landlines are also no longer supported (or are cost prohibitive), further limiting communications capabilities.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness, readiness to evacuate, and shelter-in-place should be encouraged.



Additional information about this area and its infrastructure challenges can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3 – Situation/Community Overview** and, more specifically, in **Section 2.3.4 Transportation** and **Section 2.3.5 Power, Communications, and Digital Infrastructure**.

## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points

There are a few Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) within EPA 11. Evacuees should be directed to safe areas outside the EPA. Potential TEPs include:

- Mt. Madonna County Park
- Camp Loma
- Koinonia
- Mt. Madonna School

**Evacuation Planning Area 12 – La Selva**



La Selva - 12  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)





## 1. Description

Located in the southern part of the county along the Pacific Ocean, the La Selva EPA is one of the smaller Evacuation Planning Areas (EPAs) in the county. EPA 9 Aptos borders on the north, the EPA 10 Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos and State Route (SR) 1 on the east, and EPA 15 San Andreas/Pajaro Dunes to the south.

This area is characterized by its unique topography, transitioning from coastal plains to rolling inland hills. The area is sparsely populated overall; however, the La Selva Beach community in the northern portion is relatively dense, with primarily residential properties scattered across the rest of the area.

An inactive Southern Pacific railroad track runs along the beach between the water and the populated areas. San Andreas Road meanders through the full length of the Area, providing access to Aptos in the north and terminating in the Watsonville vicinity in the south. Mar Monte Avenue provides a connection from the La Selva Beach community to SR 1—the only access to SR 1 in the Area.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

The area has a KOA facility on San Andres Road, which introduces a transient vacationing or visiting population to the area.

The Monterey Bay Academy, a grade 9-12 boarding school, lies in the southern edge of the Area, which is adjacent to the Pacific Ocean.

Bluffs along much of the coastline protect the inland residential areas from tsunami inundation.

## 3. Population Numbers

The total population for EPA 12 is 2,234.

## 4. Fire Agencies within EPA 12

Central Fire Protection District

## 5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 12

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

## 6. Threats

Fire hazards are scattered throughout the Area, particularly due to dense tree cover. This includes the presence of eucalyptus groves near the coast, which pose a heightened fire risk due to the flammability of eucalyptus trees.

While flooding is less of a direct threat, areas along local creeks may experience some flood risk during heavy rainfall, especially in low-lying areas.

The region is also at risk for tsunamis given its coastal location, particularly following large offshore earthquakes.

The entire La Selva area is at moderate risk for a damaging earthquake due to its proximity to the San Andreas Fault.

The majority of the area has a "low" liquefaction risk, but areas along creeks and San Andreas Road are classified as having a "moderate" to "very high" liquefaction risk, which could lead to ground instability during an earthquake.

## 7. Evacuation Strategy

Evacuation from La Selva Beach can be directed south along San Andreas Road toward Watsonville or north toward Aptos.

Evacuation to SR 1 would be via the Mar Monte Avenue/SR 1 interchange. Evacuation of the Monterey Bay Academy area would proceed south on San Andreas Road toward Watsonville.

## 8. Traffic Control Points

If the Mar Monte Avenue interchange is the only outlet for an evacuation of the La Selva Beach community (e.g., evacuation using San Andreas Road is not feasible), it may be necessary to deploy traffic control personnel and/or devices to maintain traffic flow at that location.

## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

Door-to-door and mobile loudspeaker notifications are feasible in the communities along SR 1. Away from population centers, residents are thinly spread throughout the area.

As with most of the county, mobile communications and alerts may be challenging and limited. Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness and readiness to evacuate should be encouraged.

Monterey Bay Academy/boarding school hosts an average of 200-250 students, some of whom may have DAFN. Advance notice and evacuation support may be necessary.



### **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

It is possible the La Selva EPA could be a receiving area for evacuees from flooding in the Watsonville Area or from the wildfires in the mountainous areas to the east.

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s) depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 12 that may be used for evacuees within the County include, but are not limited to:

- KOA Campground

Evacuation Planning Area 13 – Green Valley/Interlaken



Green Valley/Interlaken - 13  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



ESF #13: PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY – Evacuation Appendix

## 1. Description

The Green Valley/Interlaken Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) lies directly north of EPA 15 City of Watsonville. It is bounded on the west by EPA 10 Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos, to the north by EPA 11 Eureka Canyon/Hazel Dell, and to the east by EPA 16 Salsipuedes. The Area includes the communities of Amesti, Corralitos, and Interlaken. The terrain is generally flat to hilly with higher elevations to the north and east.

State Route (SR) 152 traverses the southern portion of the Area. Major arterials include Green Valley Road, which runs north/south near the center of the Area; Pioneer and Casserly roads, which run east/west and connect with Green Valley Road above Pinto Lake; and Amesti Road, which runs north/south in the southwestern part.

Smith, Casserly, and Carlton roads run north/south, adjacent to EPA 16 Salsipuedes to the east. In addition to permanent residents, the daytime population includes commuters from Watsonville and Monterey County.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

This area sits at the foothills of the Santa Cruz Mountains and has both coastal and inland water bodies. The area includes several large lakes, including Pinto, College, and Kelly Lakes.

The Santa Cruz County Fairgrounds are in the southeastern portion of the Area, along SR 152 in the Interlaken neighborhood. In a flood event, access to the Fairgrounds (a primary shelter site) may be limited.

The Pinto Lake County Park is near the center of the area and hosts various recreational activities, including camping.

## 3. Population Numbers

The population densities are low and scattered throughout, with some higher density areas adjacent to Green Valley and Amesti roads. Total population for EPA 13 is 11,146.

## 4. Fire Agencies within EPA 13

Pajaro Valley Fire Protection District and CAL FIRE

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 13**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

## **6. Threats**

Fires in the mountains have the potential to come into the valley and other parts of the EPA. In general, portions of the EPA that are subject to fire are not subject to flooding and vice versa. For example, the central part of the Pajaro Valley does not lie in a fire hazard zone; however, fire hazard zones encroach on the Areas to the east and west, as well as the north above Pioneer and Casserly roads.

Flood hazard zones are in the Pinto Lake area, north of SR 152 in the College Lake area, and extend south to the Area's southern border.

Along the coast, the area is subject to tidal influences and storm surge.

Inland, the area contains small freshwater lakes, wetlands, lagoons, and a network of creeks that feed into the Pajaro River system, including Corralitos and Salsipuedes Creeks. These water bodies often overflow during intense rain, impacting homes along the creeks, lakes, and the Pajaro River, as well as businesses and critical infrastructure. Low lying roads in the area may also be impacted by flooding.

The Area faces a severe earthquake threat from the San Andreas fault immediately adjacent to the east. Portions of the Zayante fault run across the center and western portions. "Medium" to "high" threats of liquefaction exist along Green Valley Road; west and south of Casserly Road; the southern segment of Carlton Road; and along the western border, including Amesti Road.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

In the event of wildfires in the surrounding areas, people may temporarily evacuate to the central area along Green Valley Road or to Pinto Lake Park.

In the event of severe flooding, evacuees can be directed west along Buena Vista Drive or via Pioneer and White Roads to access SR 1.

In a catastrophic earthquake, residents and commuters may have to shelter-in-place for some time if roads are damaged or blocked due to debris, ground movement, or liquefaction.

## 8. Traffic Control Points

Potential intersections that may require deployment of traffic control personnel or devices are listed below. However, determination of which (if any) will require traffic control will be made depending upon the incident.

- Green Valley Road / Amesti Road
- Green Valley Road / Freedom Boulevard
- Pioneer Road / Amesti Road
- Green Valley Road / Holohan Road
- Holohan Road at East Avenue/SR 152

## 9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations

Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media sources and participate in CruzAware, the county's mass notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system and is reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service--all of which require power service). A variety of languages are spoken in the area aside from English including Spanish, Tagalog, and Mixteco. Messaging needs to be provided in these languages and others, as necessary.

Door-to-door and mobile loudspeaker notifications are feasible in many communities.

In pockets of this area, particularly to the east towards Mt. Madonna and mountain areas, cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*. Early evacuation warnings and orders must also be considered. A culture of individual preparedness and readiness to evacuate.

## 10. Temporary Evacuation Points



Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within

the boundaries of EPA 13 that may be used for evacuees within the county include, but are not limited to:

- Pinto Lake County Park



**Evacuation Planning Area 14 – San Andreas/Pajaro Dunes**



San Andreas/Pajaro Dunes - 14  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## **1. Description**

The San Andreas/Pajaro Dunes Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) lies on the Monterey Bay, west of EPA 15 City of Watsonville. EPA 12 La Selva and EPA 10 Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos border on the north, and the Pajaro River and Monterey County form the southern boundary. The terrain is comprised of rolling hills, flat agricultural land, and dunes near the Bay.

The Area is thinly populated, with the greatest concentrations south and east of Buena Vista Road and in the Pajaro Dunes community. Sunset State Beach extends along much of the coastline. San Andreas Road cuts through the center of the Area north/south. Buena Vista Drive crosses the Area east/west in the north and connects to State Route (SR) 1. West Beach Road crosses in the south and continues eastward into Watsonville.

In the southern portion of the area, Harkins Slough and Hansen Slough merge with Watsonville Slough, which empties into the Bay.

## **2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations**

The Area represents large, significant agricultural areas due to fertile land and the presence of a significant agriculture industry.

Pajaro Dunes is a small community bordered by the ocean to the west, the Pajaro River to the north, and wetlands to the east. During winter, heavy rainfall often causes flooding, which can make access to and from the area difficult.

## **3. Population Numbers**

The total population for EPA 14 is 1,715.

## **4. Fire Agencies within EPA 14**

Santa Cruz County Fire and CAL FIRE

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 14**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff and California State Parks

## **6. Threats**

The immediate coastal area is subject to tsunami inundation, which extends east along the Watsonville Slough.

The southern area adjacent to the Pajaro River and the low-lying areas adjacent to the Watsonville and Hansen Sloughs are designated as 100-year flood zones.

The entire Area is subject to potential liquefaction, with areas along the sloughs subject to “high” and “very high” potential for liquefaction.

The Pajaro Dunes community may be isolated during floods due to access roads becoming impassable.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

During a flood, evacuees could travel north along San Andreas Road to connect with Buena Vista Drive or directly to SR 1. Those in the southern portion of the Area, near Pajaro Dunes, could use West Beach Road to travel east into Watsonville to connect with evacuation routes in neighboring areas.

San Andreas Road and West Beach Road are both subject to flooding from nearby sloughs, which could complicate evacuation routes and require real-time adjustments.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Given the small population, it is unlikely traffic control points are necessary.

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

The Area includes official migrant housing as well as informal migrant encampments. Effective communication of evacuation information will require multilingual outreach, particularly in Spanish, and targeted efforts to reach those in unofficial housing. County HSD, along with a variety of local community- and faith-based organizations provide daily support.

There is also a significant number of spoken-only indigenous languages primarily from Oaxaca, Mexico. Mixteco and Zapotec are the most common. Smaller groups, including the Triquis, Chatinos, Mixes, and Chinantecs, also have their own languages and traditions. Written messages and alerts will therefore not reach this

substantial minority population. 'Door-to-door'/area-to-area and mobile loudspeaker notifications in appropriate languages through trusted organizations and individuals are essential.

Officials should exercise cultural sensitivity when sharing evacuation information with migrant workers and their families. Partnering with local organizations and community leaders can help overcome communication barriers and ensure critical information reaches all evacuees, regardless of their housing situation. It is noted that many workers feel ties and connections to Santa Cruz County but reside in Monterey. Partnership with Monterey County is critical.



Additional information can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3.3.5** and throughout **Section 7**, particularly **Section 7.6.2**.

As an agricultural hub, coordination with businesses large and small (including farmers) is important. Animals, equipment, and other specialized resources may be needed. [obtain additional details]

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

There are no adequate Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) within EPA 14. Evacuees should be directed to safe areas outside the EPA.

Evacuation Planning Area 15 – City of Watsonville



City of Watsonville - 15  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The City of Watsonville is located in the far southeastern corner of the county, bordering the Pajaro River and is bounded by Monterey County on the south, with several Evacuation Planning Areas (EPAs) all around it (EPA 13 Green Valley/Interlaken, EPA 10 Aptos Hills/Freedom/Corralitos, EPA 16 Salsipuedes, and EPA 14 San Andreas/Pajaro Dunes). The city is one of the most densely populated in the county.

State Route (SR) 1 skirts the southern and western borders of the city and provides access via the southeast and northwest. SR 152 provides access north to Santa Clara County and Gilroy. Major streets within the city do not follow the usual grid pattern due to the City's topography. Critical infrastructure includes the Watsonville Airport in the northwest portion and a series of floodgates along the Pajaro River. In past incidents, the airport has been used to receive and store response resources.

Watsonville is unique in that it is surrounded by non-urban uses with distinct boundaries between urban and rural land uses.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

The daytime population includes commuters and other visitors from Monterey County. Some residents also commute to Monterey County. During flooding along the Pajaro River, some residents from the Monterey County side of the river may seek refuge in Watsonville.

Watsonville is surrounded by large agricultural farms, including strawberry fields and apple orchards, primarily in the unincorporated Pajaro Valley. A very small portion of the city contains direct farming operations. Watsonville does have several fruit and produce processing and packing operations and warehouses within City limits. Some farms have livestock that would need to be evacuated [need to confirm types of livestock].

## 3. Population Numbers

The City of Watsonville is one of the most densely populated areas and the second largest city, with a population density exceeding 5,000 persons per square mile.

The total population for the City of Watsonville is 52,271.

#### **4. Fire Districts within EPA 15**

City of Watsonville Fire Department.

#### **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 15**

City of Watsonville Police Department

#### **6. Threats**

##### **Flooding & Levee Failures**

Flooding is a major threat in Watsonville, particularly along the Pajaro River, where large portions of the city are within the FEMA Flood Hazard Zone.

The Pajaro River levee system has failed multiple times in the past, most notably in 1995 and again in March 2023, which resulted in widespread flooding and evacuations. A major rebuild of the levee system was initiated in October 2024 as part of the Pajaro River Flood Risk Management Project. The project is expected to provide 100-year flood protection once completed. Until then, the city remains vulnerable to future levee failures during storm events.

Watsonville is also surrounded by wetlands, including Harkins, Hansen, and Watsonville Sloughs, which contribute to the local water management system. While these wetlands do not typically flood, they can increase the risk of water system overflow during extreme weather events. Elevated water levels in the wetlands also exacerbate flooding in nearby low-lying areas and impact the Pajaro River's drainage system.

##### **Earthquake**

Watsonville has a significant risk of a major earthquake given its proximity to the San Andreas and Zayante faults.

##### **Wildfire**

Although Watsonville itself is not in a high-risk wildfire zone, surrounding areas to the north, east, and south are prone to wildfires. Winds during dry conditions could

carry flames towards the city, potentially impacting homes and infrastructure on the urban edge.

### **Hazardous Materials Release**

Farming/packaging operations utilize refrigeration, which could be a source of a hazardous materials release (e.g., ammonia, cryogenics, pesticides, and herbicides, among others).

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

The city has developed a comprehensive evacuation plan and adopted it into the City's Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP), and General Plan Safety Element by Council Resolution 42-21, January 19, 2021.

Any considerations with Monterey?

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

The City's evacuation plan does not include specific traffic control points for the threats identified above. It is assumed, however, that traffic control personnel and/or devices will be deployed at key intersections where major streets intersect with designated evacuation routes. [need to verify and get additional information from the city]

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media outlets and participate in CruzAware, the county's mass notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system and is reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service--all of which require power service.

Some areas of the city in the foothills of Mt. Madonna do not have reliable communication methods, internet, or power. A culture of readiness and the ability to evacuate promptly should be encouraged.

Watsonville has a large Hispanic population. Many residents only speak Spanish. All documentation, as well as verbal and digital communication, must be provided in both English and Spanish. A small number of residents speak Mixteco,



an indigenous language from Oaxaca, Mexico. This language is spoken only and requires specialized culturally competent outreach through trusted organizations and groups.

Areas within the City with a large percentage of elderly people (over 65 years of age) include the southwest portion of the city between Salsipuedes Creek, East Lake Avenue, Creek, and Beck Street; the northeast corner between Corralitos Creek, Freedom Boulevard, and Airport Boulevard; and the area along Main Street, South Green Valley Road, and the Struve Slough.

A large senior community in Pajaro Village is prone to flooding. Residents in this community cannot sandbag or perform mitigation activities without assistance. This area will have a significant number of individuals who will require additional notice and, most likely, additional assistance to evacuate.

Certain areas of Watsonville, including the western boundary, southwest corner, and the city center near the Portola Heights Mobile Home Park, have higher percentages of residents who may be more susceptible to the impacts of emergencies due to various factors, such as age or housing conditions. There may also be additional reliance on accessible public transportation systems or carpooling. Early notifications and accessible transit options for evacuation will likely be required.


The Pajaro Valley Unified School District (PVUSD) is the largest in the county, serving approximately 17,452 students across 34 schools in Watsonville, Aptos, and parts of northern Monterey County. A significant portion of these students reside in Watsonville. Watsonville High School and Pajaro Valley High School contribute heavily to overall enrollment. Students of all ages will have unique evacuation needs that must be coordinated with the District, including but not limited to languages other than English, disabilities, medical, behavioral support plans, emotional and support needs, age, and parent reunification plans. The District's Administrative office is also located in the city.

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) will be determined by appropriate authorities at the time of the incident(s), depending upon the situation. Potential TEPs within the boundaries of EPA 15 that may be used for evacuees within the County include, but are not limited to:

- Watsonville Airport
- Veterans Hall
- Santa Cruz County Fairgrounds (suitable for large animals)
- Ramsey Park
- Watsonville High School
- Pajaro Valley High School

**Evacuation Planning Area 16 – Salsipuedes**



Salsipuedes - 16  
Evacuation Planning Area (EPA)



## 1. Description

The Salsipuedes Evacuation Planning Area (EPA) lies in the extreme southeast portion of the county, bordered on the east by Santa Clara County and on the south by the Pajaro River, and it borders with Monterey and San Benito Counties. EPA 13 Green Valley/Interlaken and EPA 11 Eureka Canyon form the western and northern borders, respectively. The northeastern terrain is mostly mountainous, while the southwestern portion is completely flat agricultural land.

State Route (SR) 152 traverses the northern portion of the Area, and SR 129 runs across the southern portion of the Area. Carlton Road runs roughly north/south in the southeast corner, intersecting with SR 129 on the south and SR 152 in the north.

Lakeview Road begins at the intersection with Carlton Road, running south to Watsonville. The permanent population is very sparse, with most residents (less than 200) living between SR 129 and the Pajaro River in the Area's southwestern part.

## 2. Unique Geographic Area Descriptions or Considerations

The area faces dual natural hazards, including flooding in the low elevations and wildfires in the higher elevations. Despite its sparse population, the area sees seasonal fluctuations due to migrant farm workers--some of whom may reside in unofficial housing. Some of the migrant workers may live across county lines but identify mostly with Santa Cruz County. The predominately agricultural landscape supports farming operations typical of rural areas.

The few homes that are in the mountainous region are generally situated at the end of long winding roads/driveways with only a single means of egress.

## 3. Population Numbers

The total population for EPA 16 is 1,360.

## 4. Fire Districts within EPA 16

Aromas Fire Protection District and CAL FIRE

## **5. Law Enforcement Agencies within EPA 16**

Santa Cruz County Sheriff

## **6. Threats**

Several areas along the Pajaro River are within 100-year flood zones. The San Andreas Fault passes along the eastern portion of the Area, and the Zayante Fault is adjacent on the west.

Much of the Area is considered to be of “high” to “very high” potential for liquefaction. The eastern, mountainous portion of the zone is in a fire hazard zone.

## **7. Evacuation Strategy**

Evacuees from the flood zones should be directed north via Carlton, Thompson and Coward roads, and then to unaffected areas in or around Watsonville.

## **8. Traffic Control Points**

Due to the small population involved, traffic control points will likely not be required.

## **9. DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Door-to-door notification may not be possible in mountainous areas due to winding, long dispersed private roads, many of which may be behind locked gates. Residents should be strongly encouraged to monitor trusted social and commercial media outlets and participate in Cruz Aware, the county's mass notification system. CruzAware is a digital notification system and is reliant upon access to phone, internet, and/or cellular service--all of which require power service.

In these mountain areas (similar to other parts of the county), cellular service is limited and unreliable, internet access is limited, and power/electrical service is frequently and unexpectedly interrupted.

Neighbor-to-neighbor alert procedures for this part of EPA 16 should be considered for development and outlined within *ESF 15: Public Information & Warning/External Affairs*.

The Area includes official migrant housing as well as informal migrant encampments. Effective communication of evacuation information will require multilingual outreach, particularly in Spanish, and targeted efforts to reach those in unofficial housing.

There is also a significant number of spoken-only indigenous languages primarily from Oaxaca, Mexico. Mixteco and Zapotec are the most common. Smaller groups, including the Triquis, Chatinos, Mixes, and Chinantecs, also have their own languages and traditions. Written messages and alerts will, therefore, not reach this substantial minority population. Providing 'door-to-door'/area-to-area and mobile loudspeaker notifications in appropriate languages through trusted organizations and individuals is essential.

Officials should exercise cultural sensitivity when sharing evacuation information with migrant workers and their families. Partnering with local organizations and community leaders can help overcome communication barriers and ensure critical information reaches all evacuees, regardless of their housing situation. It is noted that many workers feel ties to the community in Santa Cruz County, as a result of their work and other support systems in the county even though they reside in Monterey County. The 2023 Pajaro Valley flood/levee failure response and after-action reports highlight the importance of this coordination.

The Area also has an unhoused population. Information on unhoused populations is maintained by [who?]. Unhoused individuals will require special considerations for transportation, shelter, and case management when evacuated.

Additional information can be found in the **EOP Base Plan Section 2.3.3.5** and throughout **Section 7**, particularly **Section 7.6.2**.

## **10. Temporary Evacuation Points**

There are no adequate Temporary Evacuation Points (TEPs) within EPA 16. Evacuees should be directed to safe areas outside the EPA.

## Special EPA Areas

Within the county, there are areas with unique evacuation considerations, including State Parks, Santa Cruz Port District/Santa Cruz Small Craft Harbor, Cabrillo College, and the University of California, Santa Cruz. While some of these areas are wholly located within one EPA, some span multiple EPAs. In all cases, the authorities are different. Evacuation Authorities are identified in **Section 2.1 – Evacuation Authorities.** [\[hyperlink\]](#)

### State & National Parks

Santa Cruz County is home to more than 14 major state parks and one federal park, featuring over 29 miles of coastal beaches that range from rugged cliffs to sandy stretches. The parks offer a diverse array of recreational activities, including swimming, camping, hiking, and surfing. Some parks are home to private residences. Others include sites listed on the National Register of Historic Places, including some highly guarded and treasured sites.

Among the notable parks are Natural Bridges State Beach, Sunset State Beach, Henry Cowell Redwoods State Park, The Forest of Nisene Marks State Park, Fall Creek, and Wilder Ranch State Park.

These parks showcase varied landscapes, including coastal cliffs on the North Coast, sandy beaches (such as Seacliff State Beach, Manresa State Beach, and Sunset State Beach), old-growth redwood forests in Henry Cowell Redwoods State Park, rugged second-growth redwood terrain at the Forest of Nisene Marks, river ecosystems along the San Lorenzo River, historical sites (such as lime kilns at Fall Creek), the Santa Cruz Mission State Historic Park, and Victorian-era structures at Wilder Ranch.

Many parks span multiple counties and jurisdictions.

**Exhibit 9** below provides a list of state and federal parks by EPA.

### Authorities

Evacuation authorities rest with the California State Parks and California Highway Patrol (for highways that run through parks).

## Fire Agencies

CAL FIRE

## Law Enforcement Agencies

**State Park Peace Officers:** Sworn law enforcement officers who manage law enforcement and visitor services at State Parks. These officers work directly with local, county, and state law enforcement agencies during evacuations.

**Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Office:** In conjunction with State Park Peace Officers, performs Search and Rescue (SAR) within county park boundaries; multi-county parks follow mutual aid, ICS, and jurisdictional protocols.

- **Seasonal Lifeguards:** Authorized to operate Code 3 vehicles (lights, sirens) for rescues.
- **Peace Officer Lifeguards:** Sworn officers authorized to carry firearms, manage lifeguard staff, and conduct arrests on land and water, including for boat-related incidents.

## Threats

State parks in Santa Cruz County are susceptible to a wide range of threats and hazards, including tsunamis, flooding, landslides, wildfires, and earthquakes.

## Evacuation Strategy

Each state park has its own unique evacuation strategy and is led by State Park Peace Officers in accordance with state park plans and operating procedures.

## Traffic Control Points

Traffic control points will be established as necessary in coordination with local fire and law authorities.

## DAFN & Public Information Considerations

State parks located in the county are popular year-round but become especially busy during the peak seasons from early Spring through Fall. Visitors are diverse in physical and cognitive abilities, age, and the languages they speak. As preserved natural areas, many parks lack reliable cellular communication, except where



satellite connectivity may be possible. Radios are also limited due to the diverse and isolated topography.

California State Parks uses the multi-lingual “what3words” geocode system to assist visitors. This app, which must be downloaded in advance, allows dispatchers to locate and communicate with individuals who may be lost, stranded, or in need of assistance. The app’s offline feature also aids in navigating to safe areas when connectivity is unavailable.

**Exhibit 9: State Parks by EPA**

EPA Number	Park/Area Name	Notes/Considerations
1	Wilder Ranch	Back country trails. Includes a protected historical site/structure.
1	Entire coastline in the EPA – EXCEPT Davenport County Beach, which is under the SCC Sheriff	Numerous pocket beaches with limited access and high bluffs. High fire risk on bluffs due to grasslands, coastal chaparral, and oak woodlands. Fatalities annually due to ocean-related incidents.
1	Big Basin (lower portion near Waddel Creek)	Area within burn scar of CZU Fire. Access is closed to Skyline to Sea (Berry Creek Falls) from Rancho Del Oso.
2	Henry Cowell	Has a campground with 107 sites.  Fall Creek is a day-use area and sub-unit of Henry Cowell Park.
2	Castle Rock	Includes the head river for the San Lorenzo River.
3	None	

EPA Number	Park/Area Name	Notes/Considerations
4	Wilder State Park	Most of the park is closed to public access.
4	Big Basin – Eagle Rock area	Home to a high value repeater. Lockheed Martin has a highly toxic site (result of 2020 CZU Fire), which is highly guarded.
4	Fall Creek	Not much impact; partially within burn scar of CZU Fire.
5	Henry Cowell (small part)	
6	Nisene Marks (portion of park)	Hinkley Fire Road is inaccessible to patrol vehicles. Three properties in a remote area of the park are independent and historically have been hostile to law enforcement.
7	Seabright Beach	Busiest beach in the county. State Park jurisdiction runs to the San Lorenzo River mouth; high tsunami risk.
7	Lighthouse Field	Has four large parking lots, which may serve as evacuation points, depending upon conditions.
7	Natural Bridges	
7	Santa Cruz Mission State Historic Park	Culturally important and protected site.
8	Twin Lakes Beach	One of busiest beaches in county. High tsunami risk.

EPA Number	Park/Area Name	Notes/Considerations
8	Schwann Lake	Behind Simpkins Swim Center; fire risk.
8	New Brighton State Beach	103 campsites
9	Seacliff State Beach	Potential evacuation site
10	Castro Adobe Park	Contains the only remaining two-story adobe from the Spanish era in California. Rated as high cultural significance and area of active protection.
11	Nisene Marks (small back area)	The part of Nisene Marks within this EPA is remote and includes Buzzard Lagoon Road, which is identified as "extreme fire danger". Due to remoteness, the area is subject to criminal activity.
12	Manresa State Beach – Uplands & Manresa State Beach	Popular seasonal campground featuring 64 walk-in campsites with parking located approximately ¼ mile away. Eucalyptus groves in the area present a fire risk. Primary public access is available from Sand Dollar Drive, with secondary access for emergency vehicles via Lilly Way. The beach extends southward to Monterey Bay Academy.
13	None	
14	Sunset State Beach	~ 90 campsites and day use area. 37 sites Nov 1 – April 30.
14	Palm Beach	Nearest beach to Watsonville with one way in/out. High risk of flooding and floods occur

EPA Number	Park/Area Name	Notes/Considerations
		annually. Demographic is predominately Hispanic and Spanish-speaking.
14	West Beach	
14	Cotini Coast	National monument and park scheduled for completion in 2029. BLM-owned. High drowning rate prior to development.
15	None	
16	None	
9 (some cross-over into 11)	Nisene Marks	Homeowners and land holdings in this area with populations receptive to information and authorities.

## **Santa Cruz Port District/Santa Cruz Small Craft Harbor**

### **About**

The Santa Cruz Port District/Harbor is a unique coastal area that blends commercial and recreational uses within Santa Cruz County. The Harbor straddles the eastern city limits of the City of Santa Cruz, with a small portion of the northeastern harbor area lying in unincorporated county territory. A small beach is governed by the Port District, which contracts with State Park Lifeguards to provide lifeguard services. The harbor hosts a small craft marina with 950 slips, along with beaches, restaurants, and various marine-related businesses supporting fishing, boating, and tourism activities on both the water and land sides of the harbor.

Beyond different jurisdictional authorities, the area presents distinct logistical challenges. Limited egress routes can complicate evacuation efforts, and the harbor dock complex includes 29 gated entrances, which require coordinated management during emergencies. Seasonal activity fluctuations also impact the harbor; summer months more than 2,000 visitors per day engage in beach, dining, and water activities, while winter sees a quieter influx with visitors in the hundreds at most.

### **Authorities**

The Santa Cruz Port District, a special district and political subdivision of California, holds primary authority for managing the Santa Cruz Harbor. Established in 1950, it derives its authority from the California Harbors and Navigation Code and has powers of taxation and eminent domain. Within its jurisdiction, the Port District can enact ordinances, enforce state boating laws, and mandate evacuations, in partnership with Santa Cruz Police, if necessary.

The Santa Cruz Harbor is within the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), Sector San Francisco, supported by Station Monterey. An infrequently staffed USCG substation is located at the harbor. Per Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §1.01-30, the Captain of the Port (COTP) at Sector San Francisco holds exclusive federal authority to close the harbor when safety and security are at risk. This authority includes, but is not limited to, adjusting the maritime security (MARSEC) level as needed.

## **Fire Districts within EPA**

Fire protection for the harbor area is provided by the City of Santa Cruz Fire Department and Central Fire District. Although there are no fire boats based in Santa Cruz, land-based fire services cover emergencies within the harbor and surrounding areas.

## **Law Enforcement Agencies**

The Santa Cruz Harbor Patrol, staffed by Deputy Harbormasters, operates year-round with 24/7 patrols to maintain safety and order within the harbor. The Harbor Patrol enforces Port District ordinances, state boating laws, and provides various services, such as emergency towing, pump-out assistance, and boater safety education. They are integrated with the NetCom regional emergency dispatch system, coordinating marine search and rescue with local, state, and federal agencies.

Law enforcement jurisdiction is split: the City of Santa Cruz Police Department oversees the area within city limits, while the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Office covers the small unincorporated northeastern portion of the harbor.

## **Threats**

The primary hazards threatening the harbor include tsunamis, flooding, storm surges, and earthquakes. The harbor has experienced both major and minor tsunamis in the past, along with numerous tsunami watches and warnings. Additionally, there is fire risk at land-based facilities and among moored watercraft.

## **Evacuation Strategy**

Vehicle access to the Harbor is limited to six entry and exit points. People attempting to evacuate the Harbor via auto would likely experience delays due to congestion.

During a tsunami, walking out of the harbor to a safe location is the preferred evacuation method to limit vehicle traffic leaving the harbor. The safe areas outside of the area are all walkable. During non-disaster times these areas are accessible to wheelchairs and people who have limited mobility. In a disaster,

people may need assistance, particularly if the disaster or emergency is fast moving.

### **Traffic Control Points**

Additional law enforcement may be needed at harbor gates during a tsunami watch or warning and other emergencies as people may attempt to enter the harbor to reach their boats, while others, including tourists, may gather to view the tsunami rather than evacuate.

### **DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

The Port District hosts a variety of businesses but sending out emergency notifications can be challenging due to frequent staff turnover and the fact that many leaseholders reside outside the area. The Port District Administrative Office and Harbormaster send emergency alerts and other essential messages to stakeholders and the public using various methods.

Approximately 80-100 residents live aboard boats in the harbor. In emergencies, harbor personnel notify these live-aboards through text messages, phone calls, and in-person checks, often referred to as “boat knocking.” Additionally, during an anticipated tsunami, some boaters may choose to evacuate to deeper waters outside the forecasted threat area; however, this method is not recommended as boaters may find themselves unprepared for an extended voyage and the condition of the harbor post-tsunami may not be suitable for boats to return.

For individuals with mobility challenges, harbor vehicles may be available to assist with transport to safe areas. During peak tourist season, the harbor’s high visitor volume and diverse population increase the need for additional support, including language interpretation and mobility assistance.

## Cabrillo College

*This section pending validation and final input by Cabrillo College.*

### About

Cabrillo College is the only community college in Santa Cruz County, with a main campus in Aptos (162 acres) within EPA 8 (Aptos) and a satellite campus in Watsonville (2 acres) within EPA 15 (City of Watsonville). The college offers associate degrees and certificates, serving an average of 12,000–14,000 students, with peak enrollment reaching around 17,000. The college employs approximately 335 faculty and staff and has 61 primary buildings across both campuses.

As a commuter college, Cabrillo has no on-campus housing. Staff and students commute daily, impacting traffic patterns near campus. Enrollment peaks in fall, winter, and spring, with summer enrollment dropping by about 50%. The college offers on-site, remote, and hybrid learning options, with around 30% of classes held remotely and 30-50% of operations conducted remotely by faculty and staff. Cabrillo also hosts Delta Charter High School on the [Aptos/Watsonville] campus, with approximately [XXX] students.

In addition to its existing facilities, Cabrillo College will be expanding with a new housing complex on the Aptos campus, located in the southeast quadrant along State Route (SR) 1 toward Watsonville. The proposed project will offer 624 beds, with 248 beds designated for University of California Santa Cruz students through a partnership agreement. The housing complex is slated to open by Fall 2027.

### Authorities

The President of Cabrillo College may authorize an evacuation. The President also has the authority to authorize the establishment of temporary evacuation points (TEPs) and shelters on campus when needed.

The Santa Cruz County Sheriff supports evacuations on the Aptos campus, and Watsonville Police Department supports evacuation on the Watsonville campus.

### Fire Districts within EPA

The Aptos campus is served by the Central Fire Protection District.



The Watsonville satellite campus is served by the Watsonville Fire Department.

### **Law Enforcement Agencies**

A Sheriff substation located on the Aptos campus provides security and law enforcement support for the Aptos campus.

The Watsonville campus receives security and law enforcement support from the Watsonville Police Department (WPD), with a WPD station directly across from the campus' main entrance.

The college also has an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which is staffed as needed in accordance with campus emergency plans.

### **Threats**

The area around the Aptos campus is subject to tsunami inundation and tidal surges, with inland areas near Aptos Creek also vulnerable to flooding.

Fire hazards are significant in some areas, and the entire area is susceptible to earthquakes due to proximity to the San Andreas and Zayante faults. Liquefaction risks vary across the region, with higher risks along waterways and in certain low-lying areas. Flooding and debris accumulation in Aptos Creek pose additional concerns to the main campus.

Human-caused threats, such as active shooters, protests, and other events, also present security risks. Special events hosted through the Extension program on the Aptos campus involve security coordination with the Sheriff's Office or designated security personnel.

The college has a chemical storage facility at the Aptos campus, which requires special consideration in evacuation planning.

### **Evacuation Strategy**

Cabrillo College's evacuation strategies are primarily focused on building-level evacuations rather than whole-campus evacuations. Each building has an evacuation route and assembly point, with ADA-accessible paths leading to the nearest adjacent parking lot(s).

The college is working to develop an annual evacuation drill, scaling from single buildings to multi-buildings and eventually to campus-wide evacuations. The college has a fleet of 15-passenger vans that can transport 8-11 people each, which could be used in evacuation scenarios. [Which campus is this referring to? Aptos? Verify.]

Many staff members are trained as drivers and can volunteer in an emergency. The college also has a building steward program, which as of Fall 2024 is being revamped. As the program progresses, multiple stewards per building can assist with evacuations.

### **Traffic Control Points**

Entrances onto the Aptos campus are on Upper Perimeter Road and Lower Perimeter Road. The following intersections may require traffic control in the event of a campus evacuation:

- Cabrillo College Drive/Soquel Drive
- Lower Perimeter Road/Soquel Drive
- Parking Lot A exit/Soquel Drive

No traffic control points are necessary for the Watsonville campus given its small footprint.

### **DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

Cabrillo College serves a diverse student population, including some international students and students with DAFN. The college uses the Rave Mobile system for emergency notifications, complemented by CodeRed for the College's EOC group. Some facilities on campus have a campus alert system.

Assistance with evacuating people who use wheelchairs from the campus will be necessary, as the college does not have ADA-accessible vans.

The college also has many associate and adjunct faculty who commute from outside the county. Being a commuter college, students are also impacted by disasters and events throughout the county.

The college has previously served as a shelter and Temporary Evacuation Point (TEP); however, challenges arise when campus officials are not adequately

notified in advance. There are times when on-campus sheltering or TEP use may not be feasible due to prior scheduled events, making close coordination essential beforehand.

The campus also features open baseball and football fields, as well as parking lots that have been used for emergency sheltering, including RV spaces. An American Red Cross trailer is stationed on the Aptos campus, and there are two possible designated shelter sites: Building 1100 (Gym), which can accommodate 100–150 cots, and Building 900 (Cafeteria), which has a capacity for 50 cots.

## University of California Santa Cruz

### About

The University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) is a 2,000-acre residential campus located in the City of Santa Cruz near the top of Monterey Bay. UCSC also operates several off-campus facilities, including the Westside Research Park on the corner of Natural Bridges and Delaware, and the Coastal Sciences Campus off Shafer. Outside of Santa Cruz County, the university has other smaller properties, including the Monterey Bay Education, Science, and Technology Center in Marina near Fort Ord. The main campus has limited egress and ingress, with only one main artery, which could complicate evacuation efforts, as emergency vehicles must also enter/exit along this route.

During the academic year (August-June), the university enrolls more than 19,000 students. With staff, visitors, and others, the total on-campus daily population can exceed 20,000. UCSC also has residential housing for 9,300 students with additional housing for faculty and staff via Cardiff Terrace, Hagar Meadow, Hagar Court, Laureate Court, and Ranch View Terrace. The only off-campus student housing is at the University Town Center at 1101 Pacific Avenue. The University has ten residential colleges, each with a variable number of individual buildings including apartment buildings and residence halls.

### Authorities

The University maintains its own evacuation plan. In an evacuation, The Chancellor has the authority to declare a state of emergency and officially close the campus under the *California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Section 52020*. When closed, the University of California Santa Cruz Police Department has the authority to enforce the closure under *California Penal Code 409.5*.

The California State Governor is also the official head of the UC system, and coordination with the Governor's office in some evacuation scenarios is necessary. This coordination is led by the Chancellor's Office.

Coordination is also done through the university's Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

As a special district, UCSC could evacuate at a later time or adjust evacuation timelines independent of orders issued by local jurisdictions. Those decisions would be very case-specific and involve coordination with our systemwide partners at the UC Office of the President. In general, UCSC will almost always abide by evacuation warnings or orders issued by our local jurisdiction partners and issued to county-derived evac zones SCZ-E002 (Main Campus), SCZ-E027 (Coastal), SCZ-E028 (Westside Research, 100 Panetta), SCZ-E022 (Uni Town Center).

### **Fire Protection**

Fire safety enforcement on campus is under the authority of the designated Campus Fire Marshall, an appointee of the State Fire Marshal. The City of Santa Cruz Fire Department responds to fires at the primary campus. For other UCSC properties in Santa Cruz, they are covered under the agreement with the Santa Cruz Fire Department (Coastal, UTC, Westside, 100 Panetta, etc.).

### **Law Enforcement Agencies**

On campus, the UCSC Police Department is in charge of law enforcement activities. The UCSC Police Department has 20 sworn officers. Contract security is used during large events or incidents. For large-scale incidents, such as evacuations, the UCSC Police coordinates with the Santa Cruz Police Department and/or the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Office.

### **Threats**

The campus' elevated location and surrounding forested areas make it particularly vulnerable to wildfire threats. Earthquakes and other emergencies can also cause the campus to evacuate. There are several locations on campus that are part of flood inundation maps, including 100 Panetta, Westside Research Park, Delaware Coastal Science Campus, and University Town Center.

The campus also has research facilities that hold hazardous materials. The list is maintained by UCSC Environmental Health and Safety and is shared with the City of Santa Cruz Fire Department.

UCSC has a Bio-Safety Level II laboratory on campus, which requires specific safety protocols.

## **Evacuation Strategy**

### **UCSC Main Campus – People**

A walk-out plan for anyone who is physically capable is anticipated to be the most efficient and effective option for the main campus. Current planning numbers estimate that 12,000 people can be expected to evacuate on foot to designated marshaling areas, with 5,600 people using personal vehicles and 800 people evacuating via bicycle. Prior studies placed full evacuation of the main campus at 8.5 hours, but this requires significant outside resources (buses, drivers, shuttles, additional lanes, staging areas, and so forth), which will likely not be available. A “walk-out” plan is anticipated to be the most effective.

Campus shuttles and other transportation resources to assist those with mobility challenges can be employed provided ingress/egress to the university is possible, and fuel and drivers are available. For large-scale evacuations, Metro buses may be utilized to support transportation efforts. However, Metro buses and resources are limited, and alternate transportation will likely be required, in most if not all scenarios, where a full campus evacuation is necessary.

The university also coordinates with off-campus resources, including San Jose State University and local hotels to provide temporary accommodations for displaced students.

### **UCSC Main Campus – Research & Data**

During an evacuation, sensitive materials, including research data and student information, will require secure handling and storage.

### **Animals**

The university has marine life that may require evacuation. The Vivarium Group and Delaware Coastal Sciences team maintain evacuation plans for marine life on campus.

## **Traffic Control Points**

Depending upon the situation, the university may opt to order shelter-in-place for students and faculty. The following intersections may require traffic control in an emergency, depending upon the extent and nature of the emergency:

- High Street/Bay Street
- High Street/Spring Street
- High Street/Laurent Street
- Bay Street/Escalona Drive
- Laurent Street/Escalona Drive

## **DAFN & Public Information Considerations**

UCSC's primary consideration and responsibility in evacuation planning is the students in university-owned or managed housing, which is estimated at approximately 9,300 students. Additionally, the university will need to support students in off-campus housing, such as international students as well as students who are historically marginalized or disadvantaged and lack local support networks.

Tracking students after they leave campus poses a significant challenge, especially for those needing DAFN-related support. The university's focus is on safeguarding on-campus residents while providing assistance to those requiring additional support, as well as other off-campus students as much as possible.

UCSC conducts an annual voluntary survey to determine students who may need additional support in emergencies, particularly those with ADA or mobility issues (i.e., those who may need ADA parking spaces or accessible van services. As a result of the survey, the university estimates that between 2,000 to 3,000 students may need shelter or support during an evacuation.

The university uses CruzAware and CruzAlert systems for emergency communications, though potential language barriers for international students remain a concern.

## Attachment 2: Evacuation Route Planning Considerations

### Street Network Capacity Considerations

Under ideal conditions, a single traffic lane on an arterial street can accommodate up to 1,900 vehicles per hour. *NOTE: verify numbers direction, while collector streets can handle 800 to 1,000 vehicles per hour.* However, various factors can reduce this capacity, especially during evacuations. Conversely, there are measures that can be implemented to either maintain or potentially enhance lane capacity during such critical situations. Both challenges and potential mitigations are outlined below.

### Factors that Reduce Street Capacity

- Number and spacing of intersecting streets.
- Short distances between intersections lead to frequent "stop-and-go" scenarios as vehicles navigate turns and intersections. Each intersecting street represents a potential disruption to traffic flow, resulting in reduced throughput capacity along a given stretch of roadway with an increased number of intersections.
- Signalized intersections. The presence of signalized intersections and the timing patterns of signal phases (red, green, yellow, arrows, etc.) can diminish street capacity in the desired direction during evacuations.

### Actions that Maintain or Increase Street Capacity

- Adjust signal timing to give increased preference to evacuation routes and directions.
- Barricade some intersecting streets and redirect traffic to selected locations.
- Deploy temporary signage to provide route information to evacuating drivers.
- Deploy traffic personnel to direct traffic at bottleneck locations.



- Utilize continuous center turn lanes and/or shoulders for thru traffic where practical.
- Prohibit/barrier left and right turns

Cal OES Definitions of Closures

Definition	Description
<b>Hard Closure</b>	Closed to all traffic except Fire and Law Enforcement.
<b>Soft Closure</b>	Closed to all traffic except Fire, Law Enforcement, and critical incident resources (i.e., utility, Caltrans, City/County Roads, etc., or those needed to repair or restore infrastructure).
<b>Resident-only Closure</b>	Soft closure with additional allowance of residents and local government agencies to assist with response and recovery.

### Attachment 3: Evacuation Resources

Insert different tables, and/or categories. Possible Excel Attachment and coded within Zonehaven and possibly Resources under Veoci. Ex: Transit vehicles (type, source (e.g., nonprofit/CBO, public/County/City); Traffic Control (portable signage, cones, K-rails, etc.), others.

Resource			Description	Source	Primary Use
Emergency Transit	MOU with Monterey-Salinas Transit	Monterey-Salinas Transit			
Buses		UCSC School Districts Metro			
Custom Signs	CDI has its own sign shop and can print a variety of signs with fast turnarounds	CDI			
Keys to Gated Communities	The Fire Department has access to some locked gates that	Fire Department			

	separate neighborhoods		
ADA Database		Paratransit HSD HSA	
DAFN Information		HSA/HSD	

## Attachment 4: Operational Readiness Activities

Checkbox	Action
	Confirm authorities to order evacuation(s)
	Inform ESF #5 to activate Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
	Obtain the latest intelligence on the threat (location, intensity, direction, speed, etc.)
	Identify areas at-risk and the estimated population affected
	Determine the timeframe before the threat impacts populated areas
	Activate mutual aid agreements, if needed
	Request additional resources (personnel, vehicles, equipment, etc.)
	Confirm availability and readiness of evacuation shelters
	Identify and confirm primary and alternate evacuation routes
	Coordinate with Public Works/Caltrans to ensure route viability
	Deploy traffic control personnel and equipment
	Activate emergency alert systems
	Update social media channels and websites; ensure messaging is accessible

Checkbox	Action
	Notify local media outlets
	Alert hospitals, nursing homes, healthcare coalition, and schools in the affected areas
	Activate plans for assisting individuals with disabilities and access and functional needs
	Coordinate with paratransit services (and any other organizations or agencies that can assist) for those needing transportation assistance
	Notify neighboring jurisdictions
	Brief California Office of Emergency Services
	Coordinate with shelter operators; be sure DAFN Coordinators are there to help
	Deploy law enforcement for evacuation enforcement and area security
	Coordinate with fire departments regarding the ongoing threat assessment
	Establish access control points for evacuated areas
	Activate agreements with transit agencies for buses/shuttles
	Arrange pick up points for those without personal transportation
	Ensure fuel availability along evacuation routes

## Attachment 5: Disaster Duty Officer Checklist

The Disaster Duty Officer plays a crucial role in initiating immediate response actions during a potential or actual emergency, including evacuations. This checklist is designed to guide the DDO through the critical steps and decisions required when an evacuation is necessary or imminent.

Checkbox	Actions
	Assess the situation Monitor potential threats or conditions Assess EEs Evaluate the need for EOC activation
	Initiate EOC activation Determine appropriate EOC activation levels Execute EOC activation and notification protocols (CEMT and RWG)
	Notify key personnel and leads of the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) (See Responsibility Matrix) Alert relevant department heads Activate necessary ESFs
	Mobilize resources Identify and allocate required resources Coordinate with departments as needed
	Initiate emergency protocols Adapt plans as necessary for the current situation
	Establish communication channels
	Coordinate with OR3

Checkbox	Actions
	Document actions and decisions
	Monitor evacuation progress Track population movement (people and animals) Identify and address any issues that may arise
	Prepare for extended operations

## Attachment 6: Acronyms

Acronym	Description
<b>APS</b>	Adult Protective Services
<b>BPC</b>	Board of Port Commissioners
<b>Caltrans</b>	California Department of Transportation
<b>CAO</b>	Chief Administrative Officer
<b>CBO</b>	Community-based Organizations
<b>CCC</b>	Cultural Competency Coordinator
<b>CDI</b>	Community Development & Infrastructure
<b>CEMT</b>	Community Emergency Management Team
<b>CERT</b>	Community Emergency Response Team
<b>CHP</b>	California Highway Patrol
<b>COP</b>	Common Operating Picture
<b>COTP</b>	Captain of the Port
<b>DAFN</b>	Disabilities and Access and Functional Needs
<b>DDO</b>	Disaster Duty Officer
<b>DEIA</b>	Disability, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility
<b>DEM</b>	Director of Emergency Management
<b>DSW</b>	Disaster Service Worker
<b>EAS</b>	Emergency Alert System
<b>EEI</b>	Essential Elements of Information
<b>EOC</b>	Emergency Operations Center



Acronym	Description
<b>EOP</b>	Emergency Operations Plan
<b>EPA</b>	Evacuation Planning Area
<b>ESF</b>	Emergency Support Function
<b>FEMA</b>	Federal Emergency Management Agency
<b>GIS</b>	Geographic Information Systems
<b>HSA</b>	Health Services Agency
<b>HSD</b>	Human Services Department
<b>IHHS</b>	In-Home Supportive Services
<b>ISD</b>	Information Services Department
<b>JIC</b>	Joint Information Center
<b>JPA</b>	Joint Power Authority
<b>LEP</b>	Limited English Proficient
<b>NEP</b>	Non-English Proficient
<b>NGO</b>	Nongovernmental Organizations
<b>NIMS</b>	National Incident Management System
<b>OA</b>	Operational Area
<b>OES</b>	Office of Emergency Services
<b>OR3</b>	Office of Response, Recovery, and Resilience
<b>PIO</b>	Public Information Officer
<b>RWG</b>	Readiness Working Group
<b>SAFER</b>	Situational Awareness for Emergency Response

Acronym	Description
<b>SCC</b>	Santa Cruz County
<b>SEMS</b>	Standardized Emergency Management System
<b>SLV</b>	San Lorenzo Valley
<b>SNF</b>	Skilled Nursing Facility
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedure
<b>SR</b>	State Route
<b>TEP</b>	Temporary Evacuation Point
<b>UC</b>	Unified Command
<b>UCSC</b>	University of California, Santa Cruz
<b>VEOCI</b>	Virtual Emergency Operations Center Incident Management Platform
<b>WEA</b>	Wireless Emergency Alerts
<b>WUI</b>	Wildland Urban Interface